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Abstract 
 
Within the power industry protection schemes that are designed to protect electrical 
plant and the public from power system events can be described as safety related 
systems. Power utilities are under increasing pressure to provide a cost effective, 
reliable and safe power network. To accommodate these expectations efficiencies in 
existing infrastructure and operating techniques warrant continual examination. 
Infrastructure providing remote connectivity to IEDs already exists, however the 
changing of protection functions remotely has been avoided over concerns of a change 
in verification methods. Owing to the number installed and the geographic diversity a 
request for a remote change will be inevitable.  
To respond to these requests, the project examined three key areas which were deemed 
crucial to the success of remote delivery of Protection IED configuration files;  
 Development of configuration files are consistently free of error  
 Development of a robust alternate verification method that supports remote 
configuration delivery and is comparable against traditional methods  
 Understanding the Protection IED’s responds to a configuration delivery whilst 
remaining in service; and the operational risk that it may be impose. 
These were collectively examined and addressed by the prescribed objectives outlined 
in the project.  Through assessment of an existing configuration delivery workflow, 
targeted checklists were developed and assessed to provide an improved workflow 
output reducing the probability of error in configuration development. Deficiencies 
highlighted in internal case study assisted with the development of an alternate 
verification process, which was assessed against prescribed legislative and regulatory 
requirements imposed on Distribution Network Service providers; with a further 
assessment undertaken against Ergon Energy’s traditional methods for configuration 
delivery.  
The outcomes of the project were able to describe and evaluate the systems, processes 
and criteria needed to facilitate remote management of selected protection IEDs 
installed on Ergon Energy’s distribution network. 
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Chapter 1 
 
 
Introduction 
 
1.1. Chapter Overview 
Provides the necessary background information relating to remote configuration of 
protection IEDs installed on the distribution network; justifying the need to progress the 
project, stating the project objectives and summarising the structure of the dissertation.    
 
1.2. Project Overview 
In the power industry, protection schemes that are installed to protect electrical plant 
and the public from power system events can be described as safety systems. These 
schemes historically consisted of electromechanical and solid state relays that were 
discreet devices used to detect power system faults and by design need ancillary 
equipment to provide additional control functionality.  In the early 1980s 
digital/numerical protection relays where introduced as the next generation in relaying 
technology.  
Today numerical devices are referred to as intelligent electronic devices (IEDs) and are 
software dependant which require single or multiple configuration files to apply 
predetermined thresholds and scheme logic to detect and operate for power system 
events. In a similar evolution to that of Programme Control Logics (PLC’s) the addition 
of functional logic has presented new opportunities to manage more parts of traditional 
hardwired protection and control systems within software generated IED configuration 
files. 
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Power utilities have embraced IED technology by taking advantage of their integrated 
functionality. However, there has been concern within the industry of the use of remote 
management processes to provide alternate verification techniques of device protection 
functions (CIGRE Working Group B5-09 2006). More than ever network service 
providers are under increasing pressure to provide a higher quality of supply with lower 
operational (OPEX) and capital (CAPEX) expenditure.  Ergon Energy uses IED 
technology in their safety related systems to further improve data capture and remote 
monitoring of their distribution networks; with the use of remote management 
techniques has been restricted to system event recording and control functionality.  
Implementation of a more comprehensive remote management process introduces new 
challenges to ensure the safety system is commissioned, maintain and operated in a 
manner which complies with best practice and social expectations. To expand the use of 
remote management IED technologies power utilities will need an understanding of the 
processes required to maintain quality management of these safety systems. 
 
1.3. Project Aim 
The aim of this project is to assess the systems, processes and design criteria that will 
facilitate remote management of protection, monitoring and control infrastructure used 
on typical distribution network; and through assessment determine whether a 
configuration management process can be developed to reduce on-site commissioning 
and operational works on the existing population of Protection IEDs installed on the 
Ergon Energy network.  
 
1.4. Project Background 
Power utilities are under increasing pressure to provide a reliable and safe operation of 
their power network whilst delivering reduced operational and capital expenditures. To 
accommodate these expectations efficiencies in existing infrastructure and operating 
techniques warrant continual examination. One area that has potential for increased 
efficiencies for Ergon Energy is the remote management of Intelligent Electronic 
Devices (IEDs) used to monitor and protect its distribution network. Communication 
infrastructure already exists to provide connectivity to protection IEDs located in 
3 
substations and on pole mounted installations facilitating SCADA and remote 
engineering access. 
 
 
Figure 1: Existing connectivity infrastructure on the distribution network 
 
SCADA connectivity provides control and monitoring of installed protection IEDs by 
publishing alarms, power system measurements, and associated plant status to a 
centralised operational control centre. Remote engineering connectivity provides 
protection engineers’ access to Protection IEDs as if the protection engineer was 
standing in front of the device. This in theory allows the engineer to read and write a 
configuration file to the Protection IED, extract event and disturbance recordings, and 
perform control and monitoring operations similar to that of the SCADA connectivity. 
However existing Ergon Energy’s remote management processes restrict the interaction 
to the Protection IED to on-line monitoring and retrieval of power system disturbance 
and event records. 
  
Protection IED 
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1.5. The Need for the Project 
Ergon Energy currently has towards approximately 4,600 Protection IEDs connected to 
a communication infrastructure. For the purpose of this project these devices have been 
categorised into three different types in terms of their application and functionality; 
 
 Basic IEDs – Devices with fixed functionality with configuration parameters 
typically limited to the ranges and resolutions required to define a protection trip 
characteristic. Examples of these devices are ACRs and sectionalisers. 
 
 Intermediate IEDs – Devices that typically have similar configurable ranges 
and resolutions as the Basic IED with the addition of configurable functionality 
such as programmable logic and I/O (Inputs/Outputs). Examples of these 
devices are distribution feeder management protection relays used within a 
Substation environment. 
 
 Integrated IEDs - Fully integrated IEDs with similar capabilities of that of the 
Intermediate IEDs which are communicating peer to peer with other protection 
device. Examples of these devices are line differential relays which require 
communication connectivity between two substations or IEC61850 devices 
employing GOOSE. 
 
Figure 2: Quantities of Protection IED types on the Ergon Energy network  
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A population of 1447 ACRs (Basic IED) installed throughout Ergon Energy’s 
distribution network and a further 295 expected to be installed by the end of 2015 
highlights the reason to examine alternative configurable management processes. Using 
existing communication infrastructure to reduce operational delays, costs and travel for 
staff operating under the current IED configuration processes is expected to allow better 
management of the geographically diverse population of ACRs.  
 
Figure 3: Location of Basic IEDs installed across the Ergon Energy network 
 
The blue dots in Figure 3 identify the location of the 1447 ACRs (Basic IEDs) across 
Ergon Energy’s distribution network. Test staff employed to undertake reconfiguration 
of these pole mounted Protection IEDs are based in six central locations; Brisbane, 
Toowoomba, Maryborough, Rockhampton, Mackay, Townsville and Cairns; mobilising 
staff to rectify a protection setting introduces delays. 
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Owing to the geographical diversity of Ergon Energy’s distribution network a request to 
initiate a remote change to an IED is inevitable, that is, can a protection setting be 
changed on-line?  To better understand and acknowledge the risks associated with 
remote configuration management; and to be able to respond to these requests the 
project investigated three areas of the configuration management process with an aim of 
driving quality Protection IED configurations and where possible deliver these 
configuration files through the existing communication infrastructure. 
 
Development of  
Protection IED 
Configurations
Methods of  
Configuration Delivery 
for Protection IEDs
Assessment of remote  
configuration delivery   
Engineering Access 
Remote 
Engineering 
Access 
Terminal
Pole Mounted
Protection IED
 
Figure 4: Development phases for remote configuration management 
 
1.5.1. Development of Protection IED Configurations 
Configuration quality at the IED level involves developing IED configurations that are 
of an inherent accuracy that would ensure: 
 Post deployment testing of the configuration would not identify any issues that 
were within the control of the personnel responsible for the configuration 
development. 
 The configuration is correct for the installation and the plant item being 
protected. 
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The work undertaken in this area involved reviewing and assessing existing 
configuration management processes used in Ergon Energy. With the outcome 
benchmark further improvements applied to the existing workflow addressing, but not 
limited to, the following key points; 
 Ensures minimum Industry performance standards are met. 
 Applies a quality management approach to the alternate configuration strategy. 
 Identifying and managing the source of any errors 
 
1.5.2. Methods of Configuration Delivery for Protection IED  
The ability to ensure the configuration is able to be delivered consistently and 
confidently to the intended Protection IED is identified as the next step in remote 
configuration delivery. The work undertaken here centred on developing processes that 
clearly defines alternative verification methods that will support remote configuration 
delivery whilst complying with required regulatory, legislative and industry 
requirements.  
 
1.5.3. Assessment of Remote Configuration delivery 
For the purpose of this project Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) will be considered 
to consist of two components, the first is the software and the second is hardware. Each 
is equally important to understand the effect of remote reconfiguration and the minimal 
requirements needed for operational remote changes to the protection IED. The 
firmware and software which are directly related to the protection IED configuration file 
are both addressed within the configuration delivery process. The hardware pertains to 
components that are critical for its operation and include but not limited; 
 A/D converters used for power system measurements 
 Power supply 
 Functional inputs/outputs (I/O) that receive and send signals to ancillary control 
equipment to operate primary plant.  
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Methods to determine the Protection IED’s health at the time of delivery and how it 
responds to a configuration request was also examined.  This was considered owing to 
traditional practices incorporate health checks as part of their configuration delivery 
whilst the Protection IED is isolated from the network and field staff are on site. The 
project is investigating methods of delivery of the configuration file whilst the 
protection IED remains in service from a remote location. Understanding the impact of 
limiting this could have on its primary function of protecting the distribution network.  
 
1.6. Project Objectives 
The aim of the project is to identify and document a number of strategies and their 
limitations to enable effective and efficient remote management of protection IEDs 
currently used on the Ergon Energy network; with the objective to develop opportunities 
to reduce operational delays where reconfiguration is required for installed protection 
IEDs.  Although Ergon Energy uses three types of protection IEDs as outlined in section 
1.5 the objectives of the project will initially explore the requirements needed to 
develop a configuration management process for the Basic IED type owing to the 
following; 
 The characteristics of a Basic IED configuration forms the basis of all types of 
protection IEDs used on the Ergon Energy network. 
 The increase in ACR numbers dispersed across a large geographical area.  
 
The following objectives were identified to deliver a successful project (the objectives 
are also described in the Project Specification in Appendix A.  
1) Identify existing work flows of Ergon Energy’s current configuration 
development and research the effectiveness of current management strategies 
through analysis of survey and internal non-conformance logs 
 
2) Investigate methods for setting verification 
 
3) Design a new IED configuration delivery process and analyse its efficiency and 
effectiveness against existing processes established in (1). 
  
4) Research and evaluate an alternate method to support remote configuration 
verification of selected protection IEDs used on the Ergon Energy network. 
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5) Research and test how selected IEDs respond to configuration delivery whilst 
remaining in service.  
 
6) Development of risk matrix to be used for remote configuration delivery 
Objectives 1, 2 and 3 involved the development of a configuration management process 
to ensure configuration files can be delivered for each Protection IED type consistently 
and free of error. This establishes the first step in developing confidence in delivering 
configuration files that are fit for purpose and will operate as intended. Items included 
in this work, but not limited to, were; 
 
 Establish methods to track the quality of IED configurations 
 Analysis and improvement of existing workflows  
 
Objective 4 involved development of an alternate method that can be used to 
successfully deliver a configuration file through a remote management process. Items 
included in this work, but not limited to, were;  
 
 Establish the requirements needed for operational changes for the Basic IED 
type 
 Ensuring compliance with existing legislative requirements and relevant 
Industry Standards maintaining best practices. 
 Evaluate available methods of the verification of installed configuration files. 
 
Objectives 5 and 6 involved the development of risk assessment matrix to evaluate the 
use of the remote management process for reconfiguration of the Basic protection IED 
for day to day operations.  Items included in this work, but not limited to, were; 
 Understanding and evaluating how a selected manufacturer’s IEDs responds to a 
configuration change during remote delivery with the aim to identify the 
requirement to apply similar criteria on other protection IEDs exposed to the 
same process. 
 Risk assessment matrix that bounds and evaluates the remote management 
process for reconfiguration operations. 
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1.7. Overview of Dissertation 
Chapter 2 – Literature Review: Presentation of all relevant literature for the purpose 
of developing processes and methods to establish a remote configuration management 
processes for selected protection IED applications. 
Chapter 3 – Methodology: A statement of the planed approach to successfully fulfil 
the objectives described; from improving configuration accuracy to identifying the 
challenges associated with remote delivery to selected protection IEDs. 
Chapter 4 – Configuration Management: Identifies and assess existing configuration 
management processes identifying root causes of configuration error and how these may 
be managed by the design of improved setting delivery process. 
Chapter 5 – Remote Delivery of IED Configurations: A review of the Queensland 
regulatory and legislative requirements for Protection IED testing for Distribution 
Network Service Providers (DNSPs); combined with the examination and assessment of 
the comparison between the traditional and the alternate delivery process. 
Chapter 6 – Response to Setting Changes: Details the laboratory testing of a selected 
protection IED to assess how the device responded to external influences that may occur 
during a remote configuration delivery, including how reconfiguration differs whilst the 
protection IED remains in service. 
Chapter 7 – Operational Risks: Detailed discussion on the operational risks associated 
with remote configuration and the recommended actions that should be undertaken to 
confidently remotely deliver a configuration to a selected Protection IED.  
Chapter 8 – Feasibility of Remote Configuration: A comparison of costs associated 
between the traditional and remote delivery processes to apply configuration files into 
installed Basic IEDs.  
Chapter 9 – Conclusions & Recommendations: An assessment of the degree of 
success in delivering the described objectives including future works.   
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1.8. Limitations & Restrictions 
The following limitations and restrictions will apply to the project and dissertation. 
 To comply with confidentiality and security restrictions detailed information 
involving Ergon Energy’s communication infrastructure will not be disclosed 
within this dissertation.  
 
1.9. Chapter Summary 
The chapter has provided an introduction and background into this dissertation 
introducing the Protection IED’s use and importance within the industry. Continual 
focus on distribution network service providers’ operational and capital expenditure 
highlights that an effective remote management strategy has the potential for Ergon 
Energy to maintain existing maintenance schedules at reduced costs and improve 
operational flexibility.  
The increasing numbers of protection IEDs being installed onto Ergon Energy’s 
network advocates assessment and where possible improve current processes to enable 
effective and efficient remote management; and where appropriate reduce operational 
delays. The chapter outlines the objectives of the project and concludes with describing 
three key areas that were considered essential to assess the opportunity to deliver a 
remote configuration management process. 
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Chapter 2 
 
 
Literature Review 
 
2.1. Chapter Overview 
To obtain an understanding of the current practices and the requirements needed to 
implement a remote engineering and configuration management process a literature 
review was undertaken in the following areas; 
 Relevant Standards 
 Legislation requirements of safety related systems 
 Configuration Management Strategies 
 Protection IED Configuration Management  
 Methods for assessing risk for process systems 
 Setting errors in safety related systems 
 
2.2. Relevant Standards  
To further examine whether a remote management strategy can include online 
configuration legislation compliance is essential (Electricity Act, 1994) ensuring any 
proposed strategy is benchmarked against relevant Australian Standards. 
 
2.2.1. AS 61508.1 
Australian Standards AS61508.1 details the functional safety of programmable 
electronic safety-related systems. The standard prescribes the management of functional 
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safety, safety lifecycle requirements and methods of developing validation processes for 
safety related systems. 
One section of particular interest for the progression of the project is section 6 which 
discusses the management of functional safety. The standard discusses procedures that 
shall be employed for effective functional safety which include; 
 hazard and risk analysis  
 functional safety assessment  
 verification activities  
 validation activities  
 configuration management  
 incident reporting and analysis  
Clause 6.2.10 relates to configuration management discussing the procedures that are to 
be addressed with regard the safety related system. This clause was relevant to the 
project and provided guidance in developing mechanisms for software verification and 
management.  
Clause 6.2.8 discusses procedures that should be developed for the modification of a 
safety related system and ensuring the appropriate approval and authority has been 
obtained.  This consideration has relevance to the project with respect to identifying the 
necessity for change. Though a remote configuration management process may provide 
the mechanism to allow a change to a Protection IED there also needs to be a critical 
assessment for the need to change. If deemed appropriate documentation should be 
developed to capture the how, what, who, when and why of the remote reconfiguration. 
At the 2015 SEAPAC conference a paper was (Heggie, 2015) delivered discussing 
methods undertaken by ElectraNet to modify limited functions of a protection IED from 
a remote location. The paper also provided what would be considered as a working 
example of the required documentation needed to record the process of the modification 
of a Protection IED as shown in Figure 5.  
This example clearly captures the how, what, who, when and why for the protection 
IED under modification. The paper further discusses ElectraNet’s process of 
verification and validation methods used during remote modification of Protection IEDs 
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providing additional opportunity to bench mark the project’s proposed configuration 
management process against other Australian utilities. 
 
Figure 5: ElectraNet IED modification document example (Heggie, 2015) 
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2.2.2. AS 61508.3 
Australian Standard AS 61508.3 prescribes software requirements for functional safety 
of programmable electronic safety-related systems. In particular the standard describes 
tasks that should be considered for developing validation plans for software used for 
safety related systems. A detailed review of this standard will be undertaken to help 
develop verification methods of the software used within the remote management 
strategy. 
 
2.2.3. AS 2067 
The published Australian Standard AS2067-2008 “Substations and high voltage 
installations exceeding 1kV a.c.” currently provides little guidance around protection 
systems installed within a substation environment. However the standard is currently 
under review and the first draft DRAS2067:2014 was issued to the industry in January, 
2015 for comment; with new clauses and sections added and in particular Appendix F 
which discusses the requirements and considerations for power system protection. The 
parts of particular interest for this project are; 
 F6.12 Protection relays and systems 
 F6.13 Verification of relay settings 
 Ergon Energy was given the opportunity to formally respond to the draft in whole 
which was excepted  and comments were provide in parts where improvements could be 
made to align with current and future industry practices which included the 
aforementioned parts of Appendix F .   
 
2.2.3.1.  F6.12 Protection relays and systems 
The proposed Appendix F discusses the need for regular intervals of functional testing 
of protection relays to ensure a high degree of dependability. The suggested method to 
totally prove the protection relay’s functionality should involve the injection and 
measurement of the configured operating quantities (DRAS2067:2014).  
Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories suggests regular intervals of simulated injection to 
verify protection IED functionality is not required if the protection IED is 
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comprehensively tested and commissioned at the time of installation; and a management 
program is employed to monitor the following (Zimmerman, 2014); 
 
 Relay self-test alarm contact in real time via supervisory control and data 
acquisition (SCADA) or other monitoring system 
 Potential relay failures not detected by self-tests 
 Analyse event reports to root cause, and verify logic inputs and output contact 
operation. 
 Observe and act on all product service bulletins. 
 
From this it is evident that manufactures are confident that products will operate 
effectively and confirmation of protection IED functionality without the need to provide 
external simulation is possible.   
Ergon Energy currently follows similar methods outlined in the draft clause F6.12, that 
is, commissioning Protection IEDs prior to placing them into service; and maintains a 
regular maintenance program on Protection IEDs located in substations.  Pole mounted 
Protection IEDs are also fully commissioned at the time of installation.  
Ergon Energy representatives were asked to respond to the draft standard 
DRAS2067:2014 with a considered response that aligned with the those outlined in the 
Schweitzer Engineering Laboratories White paper (Zimmerman 2014). However 
caution is needed when applying these methods as each manufacturer’s self-monitoring 
abilities will vary. Assessment of manufacturer’s recommendations will be important in 
future product selection.  
How this clause progresses through to its final publication of AS2067 could eventually 
influence the outcome of the projects’ objectives two and three outlined in section 1.6. It 
is envisaged that the final standard of AS2067 will not be published prior to the 
completion of the project; therefore it would be recommended that review of the 
strategy should be undertaken on the final publication of AS2067 ensuring the strategy 
remains complaint with respect to those areas aligned to the new standard.  
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2.2.3.2. F6.13 Verification of relay settings 
Clause F6.13 states reliance for correct operation should not depend on settings 
established solely by downloading settings or by positioning dials and plugs 
(DRAS2067:2014). In addition the verification of a setting should be tested and 
confirmed by secondary injection.  
This clause does pose some challenges with regard to remote setting changes owing to 
the suggestion protection related functions should be tested by methods involving a 
physical presence with the device. Development of an alternate verification process will 
need to encompass the means to test the applied settings to ensure they are operational 
and fit for purpose in preparation of this clause being published without change in the 
final print of AS2067.  
Ergon Energy also responded to the draft standard with suggested changes to the 
proposed wording in section F6.12 to recognise that today’s protection relays are not 
based on traditional voltage and current measurements i.e. numerical devices that use 
A/D converters to measure the applied current and voltages aligning with current 
technologies. 
 
2.3. Legislative/Regulatory Requirements  
A review of legislative requirements in Queensland for testing of safety systems was 
undertaken to determine the limitations, if any, when incorporating commissioning and 
operational works within the remote management strategy.  A review was undertaken 
on the following Legislation; 
 Work Health and Safety Act 2011 of Queensland 
 Electricity Act 1994 
 Electricity Regulation 2006 
 Electrical safety code of practice 2013 
 National Electricity Rules (NER) 
 Electrical Safety Regulation 2013 
 Nation Electricity (Queensland) Law: Current 19 19/12/2013 
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2.3.1. Legislation requirements for testing of safety related systems 
A Distribution Network Service Provider (DNSP) must protect its supply network to 
ensure a safe connection and supply to its customers and also comply with any 
directives outlined in the National Electricity Rules (Electricity Act, 1994).  Distribution 
Network Service Providers must also maintain a compliance program to ensure that its 
protection systems operate reliably (National Electricity Rule, V65). These mentioned 
legislative compliances do not instruct utilities on the method or frequency of testing of 
installed protection schemes. To compensate utilities have traditionally used years of 
design and operational experience to understand the failings of applied protection 
scheme to collate and construct maintenance programs deemed to meet with the 
required legislation. 
Review of the Electrical Safety Regulation 2013 identified in Part 11- Safety 
management systems Section s234, part 3(b) which states; 
(3) When a prescribed electricity entity’s safety management system is first put into 
effect or is modified, the entity must give the regulator— 
(b) a certificate in the approved form from an accredited  Auditor that verifies the safety 
management system has been assessed and validated to ensure the system 
comprehensively identifies and addresses the hazards and risks associated with the 
design, construction, and the operation and maintenance of the entity’s works.  
Section s234 highlights the need to obtain and review Ergon Energy’s safety 
management system to assess the hazards and risks that are documented especially 
around design, operational and maintenance of the entity’s works to ensure the project 
objectives are compliant with what is currently lodged with the regulator. Where the 
Project’s objectives are found to impact Ergon Energy’s safety management system full 
disclosure of the non-compliance shall be documented.  
Further review found in Division 2 – Earthing and Protection, Section s198 – 
Performance and other requirements for works, part (h) which states; 
The following requirements apply for the works of an electricity entity— 
(h) electrical equipment intended to form part of the works of an electricity entity must 
undergo commissioning tests and inspection to verify that the electrical equipment is 
suitable for service and can be operated safely when initially installed or altered.   
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The process of configuring a protection IED remotely will need to clearly identify the 
mechanisms to verify and confirm the configuration delivery in a manner which is 
consistent with existing industry practices and also complies with section s198 of the 
Electrical Safety Regulation 2013.  
 
2.4. Development of Configuration management strategies 
A detailed examination of the lifecycle of configuration files will help develop and 
understand the complete workflow needed to produce and maintain these files. During 
the life time of the protection IED power utilities need to consider development of 
quality assurance processes which simplifies the setting management process, 
minimises the possibility of human error and provides an auditable record of any 
changes implemented (CIGRE WG B5.31, 2013). Figure 6 displays an example of a 
generic process for managing lifetime settings (CIGRE WG B5.31, 2013).   
 
 
 
Figure 6: Generic process for managing lifetime of settings (CIGRE Working Group B5.31 2013) 
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Strategies to provide remote management of safety systems will need to incorporate 
processes to support (CIGRE, B5.205, 2008); 
1) Change Management – Processes to ensure protection IED identification is 
maintained and verified during failed in-service or upgrade conditions. 
2) Risk Reduction – to reduce risks caused by changes may be reduce by the 
combination of appropriate requirements for software protection, software 
examination and software conformity. 
3) Data Handling – encompass the areas of long term data storage and remote 
download of software and/or firmware.  
4) Version Control – is essential to provide reliable operations of the safety systems 
during commissioning, maintenance and operation. Due to the complexity of 
interrelated processes involving field maintenance and commissioning of these 
systems, it will be essential to have the ability to track changes implemented, 
where it was implemented and by whom (CIGRE , WG B5.09, 2006).   
 
A recurring theme of on-line/remote management techniques, whether it is around 
remote testing or data retrieval, is the need for standardisation. Standardising 
configurations of protection relays minimises design mistakes and human errors and 
will deliver similar behaviour from similar types of IEDs (B5.227, CIGRE 2014). 
Standardisation also needs to extend to the delivery of the configuration files and the 
verification tests required for each style of IED installed. (Kezunovic, M. 2002). Ergon 
Energy has embraced similar philosophy and has implemented standard applications for 
all protection IEDs purchased on recent period contracts.  
However where the intermediate and integrated type IEDs are installed into brown field 
sites (Non-standard applications) there is not the same rigour around documenting 
configurations expected for these applications. For these applications the protection 
setter is required to deviate from the prescribed standard imposing additional functions 
and features to the protection IEDs configuration. Therefore it is essential to consider 
techniques for both standard and non-standard applications in developing the methods 
to provide a universal configuration management process. 
To progress the opportunity of performing on-line reconfiguration of selected protection 
IEDs, surveys of field staff were undertaken, focusing on configuration file delivery as 
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well as areas of human error that may exist within the existing configuration file 
workflow. These errors can then be aligned with tasks within the workflow and their 
risk ranked with respect to the impact of the functionality under change (Liang, Lin, 
Hwang, Wang, Patterson, 2010). Success of on-line reconfiguration depends on how the 
remote management process can mitigate the risks identified and the rigour around its 
auditability (Heggie 2015).  
 
2.5. The Importance of Settings in Safety Related Systems 
2.5.1. What’s in a setting? 
The importance of bounding and understanding a setting within a safety system is 
demonstrated in findings delivered from the enquiry into the 1998 Esso gas plant at 
Longford in Victoria. The enquiry found procedural, maintenance, auditing and 
management deficiencies all contributed to a fractured gas vessel causing an explosion 
killing two men, injuring 8 others and cutting Melbourne’s gas supply for two weeks.  
The accident sequence started owing to a frequently ignored alarm which allowed plant 
processes to operate outside required parameters. This was identified as common 
practice owing to the sheer volume of frequent alarms and operators came accustomed 
to the plant operating in constant alarm mode for long periods  although some alarms 
may have been tolerable operators had no way of distinguishing between critical and 
non-critical alarms.   
“One alarm in particular was frequently ignored. It concerned the level of condensate 
liquid in a certain vessel. This could be measured up to so-called 100per cent level. 
Higher levels were physically possible but were not measureable. The alarm was set at 
the 85 per cent level” (Andrew Hopkins, 2000, p.41) 
The Esso incident involving safety systems highlights the need to have some measure of 
validity of the thresholds configured within protection IEDs installed on Ergon Energy’s 
distribution network. One method is to determine a process to benchmark those settings 
that are deemed appropriate for each application before they are applied to the network. 
“It is clear that, had engineering staff been working with operators on a daily basis, the 
practice of operating the plant in alarm mode for long periods could not have 
developed in the way it did.” (Andrew Hopkins, 2000, p.49).  
22 
Historically determining whether a protection setting was deemed appropriate for its 
application has relied on the experience and the knowledge of Ergon Energy’s 
protection engineers. Where this experience is not accessible or where external 
companies are engaged to perform similar work the depth of knowledge and experience 
of the protection engineer is unknown. In these cases a reliable verification method is 
needed further supporting the need to have some mechanism for validation. 
Another example is the 1965 black out in the Northwest of the United State which left 
over 30 million people and 270,000 square kilometres without electricity for 13 hours 
was due to a setting that was established 7 years prior and was never checked to be 
correct before the system loading condition which contributed to the event (CIGRE 
Working Group B5-09 2006).  
 
2.5.2. Misoperations of Protection IEDs 
The paper “Protection System Mis-operation Analysis” describes the leading causes of 
2,200 protection mis-operations across the North American continent since 2011 
collated by transmission, generation and distribution providers and their finding 
reported to the North American Electricity Reliability Corporation (NERC). 
“Approximately 65% of the misoperations occurred due to three leading causes which 
are incorrect settings/logic/design errors, relay failures/malfunctions, and 
communication failures” (Bian, Slone & Tatro 2014) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: NERC – Misoperations by cause (Bian, Slone & Tatro 2014) 
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“Microprocessor relays have a higher number of misoperations attributed to 
settings/logic/design errors compared to the other technologies” (Bian, Slone & Tatro 
2014). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: NERC – Misoperations by technology type (Bian, Slone & Tatro 2014) 
 
Sections 2.5.1 and 2.5.2 highlight the importance of delivering a configuration file 
containing as little error as possible. The data presented in Figure 7 further reinforces 
the need to examine the quality of configuration development in determining 
appropriate methods to reduce the frequency of error and increase confidence in the 
configuration delivery. From Figure 8 it is obvious the microprocessor relays (IEDs) 
introduce additional complexity and setting challenges increasing the possibility of 
errors compared to other technology types.  
Protection System Mis-operation Analysis (Bian, Slone & Tatro 2014) findings were 
used in developing a perception survey that was distributed to Ergon Energy’s field test 
staff to assess the effectiveness of the existing configuration delivery process.  
Though the perception survey differs from the NERC paper (Bian, Slone & Tatro 2014), 
as it is designed to report on errors found during functional testing, it is considered it 
has identify those errors that if left unchecked would inevitably lead to mis-operations.  
This paper provides an opportunity to provide a comparison of the data obtained from 
the Ergon Energy survey and may provide a method of benchmarking of 
settings/logic/design errors against other power utilities.   
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2.6. Remote Configuration of Protection IEDs 
The development of a remote management process provides the opportunities to reduce 
on site commissioning and/or operational visits. Expanding a remote configuration 
management process that facilitates changing settings on-line requires understanding of 
the Protection IEDs structure. Figure 9 is a typical layout of a digital protection IED 
which demonstrates it is convenient to consider these types of devices in three sections 
(CIGRE Working Group 34.10 2000): 
1) Analogue Input section 
2) Contact Input/Output circuitry 
3) Processing data 
 
Figure 9: Typical layout of a digital protection system 
 
These three sections can be reduced to consist of two components, the first is the 
software and the second the hardware. Each is equally important to understand the 
effect of remote reconfiguration and the minimal requirements needed for onsite 
commissioning or operational changes to the protection IED.  
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Configuration changes occur in vendor software creating a configuration file that is 
directly related to item 3) of the protection IED. To implement the required threshold 
and/or functionality the configuration file is created and written to the protection IED’s 
processor. The hardware pertains to items 1) and 2); the functional inputs and outputs 
(I/O) that receive and send signals to ancillary equipment to operate primary plant; as 
well as the A/D converters and filters used for the analogue measurements. 
This structure highlights how remote configuration may not just be a single process to 
ensure the protection IED is operational. A concert of processes may be required prior, 
during or after the configuration file has been delivered to ensure confidence in correct 
operation of protection IED. 
 
2.6.1. Verification for Protection IED Operation 
An Ergon Energy standard STNW1156
1
 prescribes a maintenance acceptance criterion 
which includes setting checks and functional testing of protection relays. The described 
testing requirements supports the need for a form of function tests to be performed 
ensuring hardware of the protection device is operating as designed. This prompted 
further research to identify other methods and/or practices that are being used to 
perform remote relay testing of protection IEDs within similar industries; or whether 
verification of these functions may be possible by other methods such as online 
inspection of the protection IED’s response to measured power system faults, event 
recording and hardware alarm contacts.  
 
2.6.1.1. Remote Testing  
One method of remote testing reviewed (Musaruddin, Zaporoshenko, Zivanovic, 2008), 
prescribes installing and using proprietary equipment or simulators installed at the same 
location of the device in order to provide low level or what is commonly referred to as 
system testing to provide protection engineers an alternative to on-site protection IED 
troubleshooting. Implementing such methods to facilitate functional testing would 
impose significant expense considering the different makes of IED implemented across 
Ergon Energy’s distribution network. In addition this method only supports those 
                                                 
1
 STNW1156 is an Ergon Energy Standard document deemed to be essential in addressing key 
goals for online IED configuration listed in the project objectives. This document is only 
available internally to Ergon Energy.   
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protection IEDs located in substation installations and would not be suitable or feasible 
for ACR Basic IEDs. This technique does not comprehensively test the scheme as it 
cannot isolate and operate outputs without additional hardware that will effectively 
reduce the inherent reliability of the system 
  
2.6.1.2.  Alternate Methods  
The health of a protection IED refers to its ability to operate as designed. Historically 
routine testing of protection IEDs have been used to examine the health and operations 
by detecting protective relay failures of those three sections shown in Figure 9. The only 
other option provided to the user is to observe mis-operations during power system 
faults by the use of events captured by the protection IED (Kumm, Schweitzer & Hou 
1995).  The amount of testing and the frequency of testing to detect these failures have 
historically been left to the DNSP to decide in consideration of legislative and 
regulatory requirements; and manufacturer’s recommendations. Routine testing, though 
by design is quite thorough, but if not balanced it is time consuming and costly on an 
increasing population of Protection IEDs.  
A recent SEL white paper discussing the recommendations for maintenance testing 
(Zimmerman 2014) describes a number of mechanisms that can be used to establish the 
Protection IEDs ability to operate for power system faults. The paper describes where 
the Protection IED has been comprehensively commissioned for its application at the 
time of installation the use of self-monitoring and alarms to detect relay failure may be 
used to reduce the frequency of maintenance. The paper also discusses the importance 
to have additional mechanisms to verify those functions that cannot be fully verified by 
self-monitoring. 
The following is a suggested regime of tests that can be used to detect all relay failures 
in a typical protection IED (Kumm, Schweitzer & Hou 1995); 
 Self-test alarm monitoring 
 Loss of signal (LOV, LOI) monitoring 
 Review of relay event reports 
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 Periodic checks of relay inputs and outputs2 
 Periodic calibration check by comparison 
 
The comparison between the digital relay self-testing and monitoring functions and 
traditional relay testing are shown in Figure 10 (Kumm, Schweitzer & Hou 1995). 
Highlighting opportunities to reduce on-site testing and at the same time provide 
alternative mechanisms to verify the complete health of the protection IED including 
alternate methods of hardware verification as part of a remote management process. 
 
 
Figure 10: Digital relay self-testing and monitoring functions replace traditional routine tests 
 
2.7. Protection IEDs Response to Setting Changes 
Existing verification practices are performed on-site and always with the protection IED 
out of service or isolated so not to cause unwanted power supply interruptions. If the 
protection IED is taken out of service then the equipment or network it has been 
                                                 
2 Where a protection IED is exposed to infrequent operation e.g. bus or transformer protection 
then other methods to verify the relay inputs and outputs would be required. 
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installed to protect may also be removed from service depending on availability of 
redundant protection schemes. A remote setting change may require similar 
redundancies as the setting change and verification process would need to occur whilst 
the Protection IED remains in service. Highlighting the importance to understand what 
affect this may have on the Protection IED and the equipment or network it is protecting 
during the remote configuration delivery.  
The remote management of protection relays and discusses the risk of mal-operations by 
a microprocessor type protecting device during configuration file delivery is extremely 
low (Pingping & Guo 2014).  The precursor to this statement is that the configuration 
file is correct for the application.  
The paper does acknowledge that a risk of mis-operation exists and could occur if there 
was a fault on the network whilst the configuration file is being uploaded.  This is due to 
the time taken for the protection settings to solidify (take affect) within the Protection 
IED. How long this takes would vary from manufacturer to manufacturer and could 
range between milliseconds to two seconds (Pingping & Guo 2014).  An example of 
this process is shown in Figure 11.    
The times taken to solidify the protection change discussed in this paper are certainly 
values that would be of little concern for transmission networks within Australia owing 
to the mandatory protection scheme redundancy requirements (AEMC - Australian 
Energy Market Corporation 2014). For sub-transmission and distribution networks 
maximum times for Protection IEDs can depend on a number of conditions; some which 
include earth potential rises and plant and conductor damage and the same redundancy 
requirements are enforced. For devices that allow a setting change to be effected whilst 
a network fault exists, the effect on clearing time will need to be considered.       
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Figure 11: Example of setting modification in micro processing relays (Pingping & Guo 2014) 
 
2.8. Methods for assessing risk for process systems 
One method to be considered is Probability Risk Assessment (PRA). PRA is a 
systematic and comprehensive methodology to evaluate risks associated with every life-
cycle aspect of a complex engineered technological entity (e.g. facility, spacecraft, or 
power plant) from concept definition, through design, construction and operation, and 
end of life of the equipment (Stamatelatos, 2000). Supporting the PRA are techniques 
such as event/fault tree analysis and/or cause/consequence diagrams which effectively 
provide a statement of what events have to conspire together to bring about the 
undesired outcome (Engineers Australia, 2012). 
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Fault tree analysis will be useful in identifying the combination of equipment and 
human failures that can lead to an event and also used to estimate the likelihood of the 
event occurring. Event tree analysis identifies the range of consequences that a rise from 
the event and the sequence of events required to produce them (Engineers Australia, 
2012). These types of analysis tools will allow the development of a logical view of a 
risk comparison between the proposed remote management’s workflow and the existing 
workflow providing a clear method of benchmarking between the two. 
An important characteristic of many engineering systems is that they behave 
dynamically. Conventional fault tree methods are designed to illustrate a solid state 
relationship between logic variables and don’t treat dynamic or human behaviours (Siu, 
1994). Where the workflows exhibit dynamic behaviours, an extension of the fault tree 
methods towards explicit state-transition methods (e.g. Explicit Markov chain models) 
or implicit state-transition methods (e.g. DYLAM) would need to be considered to 
provide a complete analysis of the risk assessment (Siu, 1994).  
 
2.9. Knowledge Gap 
The research has identified there are limited documented applications of remote 
engineering for protection IEDs. The literature found primarily concentrated on 
techniques for substation based locations typically on transmission or sub-transmission 
networks with additional detail around the methods that should be undertaken for on-
line management. The research found no documented cases for pole mounted devices 
and existing practices with Ergon Energy preclude any alternate method for 
configuration verification for a remote protection setting change.  
Owing to little information on power utilities employing on-line techniques to change 
protection functions of protection IEDs reinforces the need for the project. 
 
2.10. Chapter Summary 
Review of relevant standards, regulations and legislation has identified key areas that 
would need to be considered where any suggested process changes was undertaken. Of 
note is the draft standard DRAS2067:2014. Although still in draft form, its development 
by experienced industry professionals would carry considerable weight when comparing 
any solution.  
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Limited literature was found on actual occurrence of remote protection IED testing and 
the information that was available prescribed installation of additional infrastructure 
(digital simulators) at substations to enable remote protection IED testing.  
 In regard to alternate methods of configuration verification the review found that there 
was particular focus on substation environments that are typically part of a transmission 
and sub-transmission power network. Similar processes for remote testing of 
isolated/standalone protection IEDs installed in a pole mounted environment to provide 
a comparison have not been found. This may be owing to other utilities’ having a 
preference of commercial non- disclosure regarding these types of strategies. 
The Cigre paper on Remote On-line Management for Protection and Automation 
provides significant insight into strategies that should be consider for the 
implementation of a remote management process (CIGRE Working Group B5-09 
2006).   
Risk assessments will play an important role in understanding the risk for each process. 
It is proposed initial risk assessments of the existing work flows be subjected to the 
Probability Risk Assessment (PRA) methodology. If the initial assessment identifies 
any tasks subjected to dynamic behaviour additional techniques would be needed to 
complete the risk analysis which could lead to an iterative process as each assessment is 
developed. Once completed the development of any new process can be benchmarked 
against the existing process to compare differences and their related impacts.  
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Chapter 3 
 
 
Project Methodology 
 
3.1. Chapter Overview 
The methodology refers to the approaches that were adopted to successfully achieve the 
objectives outlined in the project specification outlined in Appendix A. The aim of this 
chapter is to provide detail on the methods used to successfully address the objectives 
and provide context to the remaining chapters of the dissertation.  
The tasks required to successfully achieve the project outcomes were: 
 Research into existing Remote management techniques 
 Configuration Management Processes 
 Methods of Configuration Verification  for Protection IEDs  
 Assessment of Remote Configuration Delivery 
 
The following section discusses the methods used to achieve each of these tasks. It 
should be noted this is not an exhaustive explanation as this is addressed be the 
remaining chapters of the dissertation. 
 
3.2.  Research 
The research outcomes have already been discussed in Chapter 2 of the dissertation. The 
main focus of the research aspect of this dissertation was to identify literature 
techniques and industry examples that provided further understanding of the challenges 
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and limitations in developing a remote configuration process that could provide the 
opportunity to initiate a remote protection setting change of a Protection IED installed 
on a power utility network.  
Considering the project objectives (1), (2) and (3) of Appendix A research in 
configuration management was undertaken to identify methods to develop a 
configuration management process. Where possible identifying methods that other 
power utilities or industry peers were recommending.   
Alternate methods for verification of configurations were investigated to enable 
progression of project objective (4). Literature was reviewed to firstly obtain an 
understanding of the reasons for existing verification and testing methods and their 
effectiveness to comply with current legislative, regulatory and power industry 
standards. This was deemed to be particularly important as the introduction of a remote 
management process will challenge these methods. Utilities around the world identify 
similar processes as the next step in developing a smarter and more efficient network 
with the implementation of such processes scattered across the world and is yet to be 
embraced on a large scale (Pingping & Guo 2014).   Existing verification and testing 
methods were also examined helping galvanise the project’s objective (6) verifying the 
Protection IED’s response to on-line configuration delivery and the operational risks the 
processes may introduce.  
 
3.3. Configuration Management Processes 
The following sections discuss the methods used to fulfil objectives (1), (2) and (3) of 
the project specification.  
3.3.1. Examination of existing practises (Objective 1) 
The existing workflow for configuration delivery was analysed to identify root causes of 
configuration errors. The effectiveness of current management strategies was analysed 
to determine where improvements could be made.  The analysis employed Fault Tree 
techniques to firstly identify the effectiveness of the current processes and secondly to 
determine those areas in need for improvement. Two electronic surveys were initiated 
and distributed to Ergon Energy field test staff to obtain an end user perspective of the 
existing delivery process. The first captured the perception of the end user’s experience 
with the quality of the delivery and was aimed at identifying any sense of existing 
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issues.  The second survey provided a progressive reporting during the length of the 
project and was aimed at identifying specific issues with current projects. 
The perception survey was designed to capture features of a configuration management 
process that should be considered in the casual analysis shown in Figure 12 including 
causes of Protection IED mis-operations described in section 2.5.2.  
The ‘SurveyMonkey’ software package was used to create the questionnaires 
considering a quality assurance process; 
 Define the problem/s by identify areas for improvement in the current IED 
configuration delivery  
 Measure configuration discrepancies and their impacts 
 Analyse this information to identify root causes  
 Develop and test strategies to Improve the process 
 Control and support the process through revised documentation 
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Figure 12: Causal analysis for an incorrect configuration file installed into a protection device. 
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The perception survey was tested and evaluated for operation and delivered 
electronically to approximately 95 field test staff. On closure of the survey the results 
were analysed to identify where the reported errors aligned within the existing 
workflow. It is acknowledged the perception survey provides a subjective view of the 
delivery process. Therefore to capture a progressive measure of configuration 
discrepancies a one page “Tick and Flick” repeatable progressive survey was delivered 
to the same personnel to report on identified errors observed during the present day and 
over the following 3 – 6 months.  The progressive survey provided the ability to 
compare the results between it and results obtain from the perception survey. It is 
intended that this survey will be revised and reinitiated at the end of the project to 
monitor and measure the improvements made to the configuration delivery process.   
To obtain endorsement to deliver the survey internally to Ergon Energy presentations to 
the following stakeholders were undertaken; 
1. Ergon Energy’s Engineering Standards Management team – This initial 
presentation was delivered to senior management to firstly obtain approval to 
issue both surveys and secondly to engage management by providing the 
opportunity to respond to any concerns and/or offer improvements to the survey 
delivery. 
2. Secondary Systems Managers and Supervisors – To promote the reasons for the 
survey and to obtain support at the local level to help increase frequency of 
survey responses. 
3. Ergon Energy’s Protection team – to inform and advise Ergon Energy’s 
Protection groups of the delivery of each survey and discuss the content of the 
questionnaire. This was essential owing to the surveys being designed to capture 
errors of work delivered by these groups. 
Owing to the location of staff the presentations were delivered via video and 
teleconference facilities.  
 
3.3.2. Methods of Setting Verification (Objective 2) 
This involved development and examination of methods for setting verification that 
may be implemented to reduce the likelihood of configuration errors.  
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To verify a proposed setting has some validity compared to those expected to be applied 
on the distribution network the possibility of bench marking protection settings was 
examined. This task initially selected and analysed the subset of settings that were 
deemed to be most critical for a distribution network. An expectation was that identified 
techniques may be used to analyse the remaining configuration settings of the Protection 
IED. The effectiveness of other criteria to capture deviations from previous 
configuration events such as frequency of change and abnormal increases in setting 
magnitude were also examined.  
 
3.3.2.1. Bench Marking 
The historical settings used for this analysis are located within Ergon Energy’s 
protection database system. To access the required data for the analysis SQL queries 
needed to be developed to search for each critical setting applied to the basic IED type. 
The methodology of the initial data for which the SQL script was written to search for is 
shown in Figure 13. 
 
 
Basic 
IED
FDR
BAY
Prot
Basic 
IED
Line 
Prot
Device 
1
Basic 
IED
Line 
Prot
Device 
2
Basic 
IED
Line 
Prot
Device 
3
SQL Query 1 SQL Query 2
 
Figure 13: Initial methodology for SQL script development 
 
SQL query 1 was developed to capture all settings of Basic IEDs that have been 
installed at the substation bay of Ergon Energy 11kV distribution feeders. The second 
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query (SQL query 2) was developed to capture all settings applied to line devices 
downstream of the substation. It is suspected for some settings additional queries may 
be required to provide a more granular approach for a successful analysis. Where 
considered necessary an example of proposed additional SQL queries are displayed in 
Figure 14.  
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Figure 14: Increased SQL queries for a more granular analysis 
 
3.3.2.2. Measurement of Bench Marking Outcomes 
With the data collected it is proposed to expose each setting string to the Normal 
Distribution functions to determine the mean and standard deviation of each query. The 
resultant mean and standard deviations are to be analysed against current Ergon Energy 
protection philosophy to quantify the effectiveness of the analysis. It is hoped this 
analysis can provide a sanity check of a new proposed setting against historical settings 
implemented on Ergon Energy’s entire distribution network. Furthermore the new 
setting could employ the following criteria; 
  Frequency of change – Flag an abnormality where there is an excessive amount 
of change to the one setting over a prescribed period of time. This may be 
indicative of inexperience of the protection setter or an undefined network 
condition. 
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 Magnitude of change – Flag an abnormality where there is an increase in 
magnitude outside a prescribed boundary to capture those settings applied 
through inexperience.    
 
3.3.3. Development of an Improved Configuration Process (Objective 3) 
Development of an improved configuration delivery process was undertaken using the 
information obtained from sections 3.3.1 and 3.3.2. The survey results provide those 
areas that warranted the most attention to improve confidence in configuration delivery. 
It was also important to acknowledge during development of the new process that Ergon 
Energy’s protection schemes still contain a mix of electromechanical, solid state and 
numerical devices. The project’s objectives are centred on Protection IEDs which 
require configuration files (numerical devices) to deliver the remote management 
capability. As there still remains a population of electromechanical and solid state 
protection relays that do not support remote management it was important that 
implementation of proposed improvements had to ensure no adverse impacts.   
 
3.4. Methods of Configuration Verification (Objective 4)   
A review of existing verification techniques used for Protection IEDs was undertaken to 
identify whether an alternative verification technique could be used to support remote 
configuration delivery.  The proposal is to limit remote management to commissioned 
devices so remote configuration changes will be initially undertaken on existing 
Protection IEDs. The analysis was undertaken considering brown field applications 
(installed devices) for the Basic IED.  
With the power utility industry cautious of using alternative techniques to verify 
installed a review of Ergon Energy’s current methods were undertaken by examining 
the following: 
 Case Study – Analyse an abnormality discovered during a recent extraction of a 
configuration file from a protection device whilst under current verification 
technique.   
 Ergon Energy’s standard work practice SP0518 - describing the basic testing 
philosophies that are currently employed in relation to setting changes to a 
protection relay.  
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 National and Queensland regulatory requirements - reviewed to determine the 
requirements imposed on to Distribution Network Service Providers (DNSP) to 
remain compliant in relation to protection schemes.  
 
On completion, an alternative processes for remote configuration delivery was 
developed and is discussed. Highlighting the difference between the software and 
hardware of a Protection IED is also essential owing to the proposed delivery process 
eliminating on site testing. To ensure best industry practice is maintained changes to the 
verification process will be compared to what is currently in use.  
 
3.5. Assessment of Remote Configuration Delivery (Objective 5 & 6) 
The following sections introduce the methods used to fulfil objectives (5) and (6) of the 
project scope.  
 
3.5.1. Simulation of Remote Configuration delivery 
Concerns of changing a setting on line during the configuration delivery have been 
described in section 2.7 (Pingping & Guo 2014). The action of delivering a 
configuration to a protection IED whilst remaining in service is not common practice 
for power utilities (CIGRE Working Group B5-09 2006). Therefore it is deemed 
necessary to test some device types used on Ergon Energy’s distribution network to 
understand the issues associated with this process.  The selected device to be tested was 
one of the Basic type IEDs typically installed on Ergon Energy’s 11kV distribution 
network. 
 
An understanding of how the selected IED should operate during the remote setting 
delivery process was needed. Owing to manufacturer’s intellectual property details of 
the internal construction and operation of the device is not disclosed publically. The 
manufacturer was approached to obtain further details and they proceeded to provide a 
high level description on how the device is expected to respond for configuration 
delivery whilst in service. A flowchart was developed and provided to the manufacturer 
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to comment on its accuracy prior to testing. The resultant flow chart from this exercise 
is shown in Figure 44 section 6.1.1.  
To simulate remote configuration delivery to an in service device, a Basic IED located 
in Townsville was designated as the remote Protection IED. A configuration was sent 
from a desktop computer located in Toowoomba over the same communication network 
currently employed to provide engineering access to Protection IEDs shown in Figure 1. 
Tests were performed under controlled laboratory conditions to assess the accuracy of 
the flow chart. The tests undertaken for this assessment are described in Chapter 6.   
 
3.5.2. Risk Matrix for Remote Configuration delivery 
With the knowledge gained from the literature review, the new configuration delivery 
process developed, an alternate verification method established and the simulation 
testing for remote configuration delivery complete, operational risks where determined. 
These risks were evaluated against Ergon Energy Corporate Risk Assessment Tables   
evaluating the impact and the control measures that are to be implemented. Furthermore 
listing recommended considerations in developing checklists for remote configuration 
delivery capturing the how, what, who, when and why concentrating on the outcomes 
from section 3.5.1 and recommendations outlined in Clause 6.28, of AS61508.1.   
 
3.6. Chapter Summary 
The chapter discusses the processes and techniques used to successfully complete the 
objectives of the project. Furthermore it provides the opportunity to broadly divide the 
tasks of the dissertation into; research, configuration management processes, protection 
IED configuration delivery and assessment of remote configuration delivery. 
Association of the broad task with each chapter/s is shown in Table 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
41 
Table 1: Association between the broad tasks, Dissertation chapters and related objectives 
Broad task Relevant chapters Related objectives 
Research 2. Literature Review (1), (2), (3), (4), (5) 
Configuration 
Management Processes 
4. Protection IED 
Configuration Management 
(1), (2), (3) 
Methods of Configuration 
Verification for protection 
IEDs 
5.Remote Delivery of 
Protection IED Configurations 
(4) 
Assessment of Remote 
Configuration Delivery 
 
6.Response to Remote 
Reconfiguration 
(5) 
Risk Matrix 7. Operational Risks (6) 
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Chapter 4 
 
 
Configuration Management 
 
This chapter will identify and assess the existing configuration management processes 
identifying root causes of configuration errors and suggest improvements to the 
configuration development process. 
4.1. Existing Configuration management practices 
To examine Ergon Energy’s existing protection configuration delivery process a 
workflow (Figure 15) was developed with reference to Ergon Energy’s P56P02 
Protection Setting Procedure document. This identified three key outputs which form 
part of the configuration delivery. 
 The Protection Setting Report 
 The configuration file 
 The Protection Setting Request (PSR) 
The Protection Setting Report is the start of the process.  It details the protection setter’s 
method of developing the setting including any network issues that have influenced the 
final setting or groups of settings to be installed into a protection IED.   
The configuration file is vendor specific and is dependent on the intended protection 
IED. The required settings are applied to a configuration file which is then written to the 
Protection IED. 
The Protection Setting Request (PSR) is a formal document capturing the ‘what’ and 
‘where’ of the installation; including identifying the Protection IED, thresholds and time 
characteristics that are to be configured within the Protection IED, and the required 
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firmware.  The PSR is electronically stored and used as the primary reference document 
for Ergon Energy operational staff.  
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Figure 15: Existing Protection Setting Workflow 
 
To examine the effectiveness of the existing configuration delivery process a fault tree 
analysis was undertaken for the development of settings for non-standard and standard 
applications providing an estimated probability of error.  
Figure 16 identifies the probability of error for Non-Standard (Brown field) application 
and Figure 17 provides the probability for Standard applications. Each task within the 
fault tree was assigned a probability of occurrence dependant on its perceived activity 
type (Engineering Australia 2012). The values used are listed in Appendix B. The 
probability values used during the fault trees analysis considered the worst case scenario 
where the protection setter was deemed to be less experienced in the development of the 
Protection Setting report and configuration of the Protection IED.  Where these tasks 
were performed by a more experienced protection setter then the probability of error is 
expected to be lower.  
 
44 
4.1.1. Non-Standard Configuration delivery  
Four milestones were identified within the fault tree analysis aligning to the outputs 
provided by the protection setter; 
 Error in Protection Setting Report 
 Configuration file error 
 Protection Setting Request (PSR) error 
 Error in configuration delivery 
 
Setting report errors are influenced by calculations and changes to control functions and 
logic to support non-standard installations. Based on the fact that the primary focus of 
the protection setter is to protect the network, errors in thresholds and or time 
characteristic were deemed as routine tasks that would require some care. Non-standard 
applications typically include changes to input and output logic, control and SCADA 
indications for specific application. These works were deemed to be complicated non-
routine tasks owing to the deviation from what the setter would be accustomed to. Issue 
of the Protection Setting Report would occur after peer review. The probability of error 
applied here is that of a walk around inspection owing to the fact that there is no defined 
description of the targeted features that should be reviewed.     
Configuration file error is influenced by the setter’s knowledge and experience with the 
Protection IED when applying features that deviate from a prescribed standard. 
Applications of standard features to the logic would have low probability of error; 
however the application of non-standard logic may create feature interaction or be 
simply entered incorrectly. The Protection Setting Request (PSR) is derived from either 
the Protection Setting Report or by the configuration file. This depends on the how the 
setter steps through the process. Method 1 (displayed is Figure 16) where the setter has 
created the Protection Setting Request (PSR) directly from the Protection Setting 
Report. Method 2 (displayed in Figure 17) is where the setter has used the configuration 
file to create the Protection Setting Request (PSR). 
Ultimately an error in the configuration delivery is managed by both the peer review 
employed to detect errors generated within the configuration file and the method of 
error generation within the Protection Setting Report. 
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Figure 16: Fault tree for Non-Standard configuration delivery (method 1) 
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Figure 17: Fault tree for Non-Standard configuration delivery (method 2) 
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4.1.2. Standard configuration delivery 
The same four milestones were identified within the standard configuration delivery 
fault tree analysis, once again aligning to the outputs provided by the protection setter; 
 Error in Protection Setting Report 
 Configuration file error 
 Protection Setting Request (PSR) error 
 Error in configuration delivery 
 
The same error probabilities are used as expected in the non-standard application, 
however for standard applications the non-routine tasks are not present as these have 
already been accounted for. Changes to input and output logic, control and SCADA 
indications were not considered owing to standard configurations contain pre-defined 
descriptions regarding these features. Setting report errors are influenced by calculations 
for the desired application. Checking of the report is similar to a walk around inspection 
owing to there is no defined description of the targeted features that should be reviewed.     
Configuration file errors are limited as the setter’s knowledge and experience with the 
Protection IED is only required to apply trip thresholds and time characteristics, which 
is deemed to be a routine task with care needed.  
The Protection Setting Request (PSR) is influenced by either the Protection Setting 
Report or by the configuration file. This depends on the how the setter steps through the 
process. Figure 18 displays method 1 where the setter has created the Protection Setting 
Request (PSR) directly from the Protection Setting Report. Figure 19 displays method 2 
where the setter has used the configuration file to create the Protection Setting Request 
(PSR). 
Errors in configuration delivery are managed by peer review employed to detect errors 
generated within the configuration file and method of error generation within Protection 
Setting Report. 
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Figure 18: Fault tree for Standard configuration delivery (method 1) 
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Figure 19: Fault tree for Standard configuration delivery (method 2) 
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4.1.3. Results of fault tree analysis 
Each of the non-standard and standard processes were examined considering their 
associated milestones. The decision for the setter to choose one or the other direction 
through the process for the non-standard delivery produced different ranges of 
probability error ranging from 22.36 % to 33.36%. The standard delivery was not 
affected by the differing paths through the process providing probability error of 2.06% 
 
4.2. Effectiveness of existing Configuration Management Practices  
The effectiveness of the existing practices was captured by the use of perception and 
progressive surveys.  
 
4.2.1. Perception survey results 
The perception survey described in section 3.3.1 was delivered to 97 field test staff and 
returned a response of approximately 38% of the total number. This was due to the fact 
that it was a voluntary survey and that some staff had not been exposed to the device 
types covered by the survey. The data collated provided an indication of where to 
investigate to improve the existing workflow. 
The perception survey targeted both commissioning and operational configuration 
changes. Average errors rates for commissioning and maintenance were 35% and 22% 
respectively and are displayed in Figure 20 and Figure 21.  Commissioning was deemed 
to be where a setting or configuration was issued for a new installation and operational 
changes covered existing installations that required changes due to feeder augmentation 
works or responses to protection feeder reviews. The survey questions developed to 
obtain these results are provided in Appendix C.2.  A CIGRE paper on fault statics for 
Protection IED lists the error rate for numerical protection relays undergoing 
commissioning tests at 35% (Kjolle 2002); indicating the results from the perception 
survey may not be unrealistic.  
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Figure 20: Surveyed percentage error of configuration delivery for the Basic IEDs (Commissioning) 
 
 
Figure 21: Surveyed percentage error of configuration delivery for the Basic IEDs (Maintenance) 
 
On acknowledging an error the respondents were then progressed through the 
perception survey and asked to rank the occurrence of errors of key features that were 
deemed operational critical for the Basic IED.  These features were chosen on industry 
experience and considering the mis-operation literature discussed in section 2.5.2; these 
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features included Tripping thresholds, Time characteristics, Control and Indication and 
Device firmware with the results shown in Figure 22.   
 
 
Figure 22: Perception survey - Ranking of error types for Basic IEDs 
 
This initial ranking of the key components shown in Figure 22, identified that each were 
subjected to an error when delivered to the end user. Tripping and time characteristics 
were ranked similar, with 2% of the responses acknowledging errors are sometimes 
observed. Control and indication responses returned a combination of observations, 4% 
were errors always observed, 9% were regularly observed and 36% of responses were 
error sometimes observed. Finally the result for device firmware indicated 27% of the 
responses sometimes observed the error. 
Tripping and time characteristics were of some concern prompting further examination 
into the reasons for this discrepancy. Over 50% of responses consistently had errors in 
control and indication, highlighting a high deficiency in the existing Protection Setting 
workflow. The results reported 27% of responses identified device firmware to have an 
error sometimes observed. Ergon Energy has gone to great lengths to manage firmware 
and vendor software for of all protection IEDs. This response was an interesting and 
unexpected result. 
To help further examine these results the perception survey questions were designed to 
identify the origin of the discrepancies. Where the respondents had identified a 
discrepancy of one or more of these features displayed in Figure 22, they were asked to 
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rank the origin and type of error to help further identify root causes of error within the 
configuration delivery workflow. The results of these more granular questions are 
provided in Appendix C.3. The origin of the error is summarised in Table 2 which lists 
the three key documents that are developed and issued to deliver a configuration file for 
a proposed Protection IED. The results for the ‘type of errors’ have been used as areas 
of concentration in developing improvements to work flow outlined section 4.4.   
 
Table 2:  Survey question summary for the origin of errors for the Basic IED 
Basic IED Features 
Origin of the Error  
Protection 
Setting Report 
Protection 
Setting Request 
(PSR) 
Configuration 
File 
Tripping  
Threshold 
High Medium Low 
Time  
Characteristics 
High Medium Low 
Control or 
Indication 
High N/A Medium 
Firmware N/A High Low 
 
4.2.1.1. Summary of Perception survey 
Table 3 indicated the highest origin of error experienced by field test staff was the 
protection setting report, followed by the PSR, then by the configuration file.  It must be 
acknowledged that the discrepancies provided by this survey do not in away reflect the 
validity of the setting to detect network faults. The results only highlight that the end 
user identifies discrepancies between the three components of the delivery process used 
to install the required setting. Standard Work Practice (SWP) SP0518 (Ergon Energy 
2012) directs test staff to compare these documents to ensure they align with each other 
prior to testing Protection IED. An example identified is where a Protection Setting 
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Report requests a setting of 60A and the nearest available setting selected in the device 
is 58A. According to the testing SWP this would be classified as an error and most 
likely it would be attributed to the report. 
 
4.2.2. Progressive Survey  
The progressive survey which continued to run over the length of the project targeting 
key error types in Figure 22 as well as capturing functional logic and design. The 
addition of logic and design was included to capture errors associated with the higher 
level device types (intermediate and integrated IEDs) to help progress remote 
configuration for these Protection IED types in the future. It was also deemed prudent 
for this information to be included into any improvements made to the existing 
configuration development workflow.  The responses obtained by the progressive 
survey are displayed in Figure 23.  
 
 
Figure 23: Error types identified by the Progressive survey 
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4.2.2.1. Results of the Progressive survey  
The progressive survey confirmed each of the aforementioned outputs remain 
susceptible to errors under the existing configuration workflow. With tripping and timer 
characteristics returning a 10% and 5% discrepancy rate respectively. This was an 
improvement compared to the original result obtained by the perception survey. Device 
firmware was also lower at a value of 5%.   
The components of functional logic and design added to the progressive survey 
provided valuable information for the reasons for functional logic errors.  Surveying 
these components returned a 51% error rate for functional logic, and an error rate of 
41% for functional design. As these two components are interrelated to obtain correct 
functionality the error rate returned would suggest for some of these errors there is a 
direct relationship between the two components.  Where a design of the installation 
varies to the configured functional logic of the Protection IED the end user may 
interrupt this as a configuration error. Under these circumstances the error is not with 
the workflow but with the information provided prior to configuration development.   
 
These results to date have only captured errors related with the configuration delivery of 
the intermediate protection IEDs owing to the lack of Basic IEDs installed over the time 
of the progressive survey. The workflow under examination is used to develop and 
deliver configuration files and documentation for both Basic and Intermediate 
Protection IEDs, therefore these results thus far provide an actual insight into the 
effectiveness of the existing workflow. Once the recommended improvements have 
been implemented the progressive survey will be continual improved to remain as an 
active tool to help further measure, analyse and develop improvements to the 
configuration workflow. 
 
4.3. Methods of Setting Verification  
The survey response indicated that the Protection setting report was a component of the 
delivery process that needed improvement. The following sections investigated some 
potential methods of verifying critical settings that are developed and captured within 
the setting report. To analysis the effectiveness of these proposed methods selected 
critical settings for the Basic IED were identified and used for the analysis.  
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4.3.1. Critical Settings for a Distribution  Network 
Table 3 lists those settings that were deemed most critical and those that were data 
mined within Ergon Energy’s Protection Database System by using the first SQL query 
as described in section 3.3.2.1. 
 
Table 3: Critical settings for a distribution network 
Protection Element Application 
Overcurrent  Overcurrent protection is designed to detect and isolate 
for short circuits between two or more phases.  
Earth Fault 
 Earth fault protection is designed to detect and isolate 
for short circuits between a phase and neutral or a phase 
and earth. 
Sensitive Earth Fault 
(SEF) 
 Sensitive Earth Fault protection designed to detect and 
isolate those faults that are beyond the sensitivity of the 
IDMT Earth Fault protection elements.  
Phase time multiplier 
 Increases the phase overcurrent setting and typically is 
set to a multiple of 1.0 times the applied overcurrent 
threshold.  
 
4.3.2. Criteria of selected settings 
To analyse the results of the SQL query an understanding of Ergon Energy’s 
requirements for determining appropriate setting for each of the critical settings listed in 
Table 3 was needed. The Ergon Energy standard document STNW1002 (Ergon Energy 
2014) lists the recommended criteria for overcurrent, earth fault and sensitive earth fault 
thresholds when determining an appropriate setting for an intended application. 
One of the most critical criteria in determining tripping thresholds for each setting is to 
ensure detection of all possible faults located within the protected zone. The ability for a 
protection device to detect these is commonly referred to as the Protection Reach Factor 
(also known as Safety Factor, Operating Reach Factor or Reach). The Protection Reach 
Factor applies to both the overcurrent and earth fault settings; and can be defined as the 
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ration of the minimum fault current of a protected zone divided by the pickup setting of 
the upstream primary protective device (Ergon Energy 2014). 
 
Protection Reach Factor =
Ifmin
Ipickup
 
          (4.1)
3
 
Where: 
 Ifmin – minimum fault current in the protected zone 
 Ipickup – the setting threshold of the protection element 
 
Calculation of these reach factors are typically performed using modelling tools. It is 
important to acknowledge the variables and methods that are used to determine the 
minimum Protection Reach Factors for applied overcurrent and earth fault thresholds to 
provide validation of the results produced by first SQL query described in section 
3.3.2.1.  
The Ergon Energy standard STNW1002 describes Protection Reach Factors for both 
Primary and Backup applications. Primary protection is considered as the device 
directly upstream of the fault location and is expected to detect the fault in the first 
instance. In cases where the primary device fails to operate the next upstream device is 
configured to provide backup. This philosophy complies with the National Electricity 
Rules requirement for credible contingencies for fault clearance (AEMC - Australian 
Energy Market Corporation 2014). 
 
4.3.2.1. Overcurrent Protection Reach Factors 
The prescribed Protection Reach Factors for overcurrent thresholds are listed in Table 4. 
Phase multiplier is also considered in regard to the reach factors as application increases 
the pickup setting (Ipickup) by the multiple of Phase multiplier. 
 
                                                 
3
 (Ergon Energy 2014) 
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Protection Reach Factor =
Ifmin
Ipickup× Phase Multiplier
 
          (4.2) 
Table 4:  Overcurrent Protection Reach Factors 
Protection Reach Factors / [Minimum] 
System 
Normal  
Abnormal Network 
Operating Condition 
Primary Protection  1.7 1.3 
Backup Protection  1.3 1.3 
 
 
4.3.2.2. Variables determining Overcurrent Protection Reach Factors 
A simplified circuit for a phase to phase fault on a distribution network is shown in 
Figure 24. The circuit identifies the variables that determine the magnitude of phase to 
phase fault current (If) produced. To calculate the prospective phase to phase fault that 
the protected equipment or line is subjected to and an equivalent sequence component 
circuit shown in Figure 25.   
Z
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Figure 24: Simplified Impedance circuit for a phase to phase fault 
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Figure 25: Sequence component connection for a phase to phase fault 
 
These equivalent sequence components are then used to determine the phase to phase 
fault current detected on the network by the following formula; 
 
𝐼𝑎1 = −𝐼𝑎2 =
Ea
 Z1 + Z2 + Zf
 
          (4.3) 
Where: 
 𝐼𝑎1 – is the positive sequence current 
 𝐼𝑎2 – is the negative sequence current 
 Ea   – is the source voltage 
 Z1  – is the positive sequence impedance 
 Z2  – is the negative sequence impedance 
 Zf  – is the fault impedance 
 
The Zf of the circuit shown in Figure 25 is typically assumed to be of low impedance 
value for phase to phase faults.  Owing to the low fault impedance the magnitude of 
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fault current calculated would mainly be dependent on the sequence positive (Z1) and 
negative (Z2) impedance.  Typically for non-rotating plant and where the fault location 
is remote from generation Z2 is assumed to be the same as Z1. These impedances values 
on a distribution network vary depending on the strength of the source and the 
conductor impedances of the network. These impedances determine the level of fault 
current that is presented to the Protection IED.  The protection setter uses these values 
in conjunction with the overcurrent Protection Reach Factors given Table 4 to obtain the 
required tripping threshold.  Overcurrent tripping thresholds therefore vary depending 
on the networks topology, conductor sizes and lengths. 
 
4.3.2.3. Earth Fault Protection Reach Factors 
The prescribed Protection Reach Factors for Earth Fault thresholds are listed in Table 5. 
Table 5:  Earth Fault Protection Reach Factors  
Protection Reach Factors / [Minimum] 
System 
Normal  
Abnormal Network 
Operating Condition 
Primary Protection  2.0 1.3 
Backup Protection  1.3 1.3 
 
 
4.3.2.4. Variables determining Earth Fault Protection Reach Factors 
A simplified circuit for a phase to earth fault on the network is shown in Figure 26.  The 
circuit identifies the variables that determine the magnitude of phase to earth fault 
current (If) produced. To calculate the prospective phase to earth fault current that the 
faulted equipment or line is subjected to an equivalent sequence component circuit as 
shown in Figure 27.   
61 
Z
Z
Z
Ea
Ec
Eb
Zf
Ib
Ia
Ic
Va
Vb
Vc
 
Figure 26: Simplified impedance circuit for a phase to neutral / ground fault 
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Figure 27: Sequence component connection for a phase to neutral / ground fault 
 
The equivalent sequence impedances are used to determine the phase to ground fault 
current detected for the network using the following formula; 
 
𝐼𝑎1 =
Ea
Z0 +  Z1 + Z2 + 3∙Zf
= 𝐼𝑎0 = 𝐼𝑎2 
          (4.4) 
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Where: 
 𝐼𝑎1 – is the positive sequence current 
 𝐼𝑎2 – is the negative sequence current 
𝐼𝑎0 – is the zero sequence current 
 Ea   – is the source voltage 
 Z1  – is the positive sequence impedance 
 Z2  – is the negative sequence impedance 
 Zf  – is the fault impedance 
 
Ergon Energy’s present protection philosophy sets the Zf in Figure 27 to a value of 50Ω 
for earth fault analysis.  This is significantly higher than the combined source and line 
impedances of the upstream network providing a relatively consistent value of 
impedance for the protection setter to use in conjunction with the earth fault Protection 
Reach Factors (given in Table 5).     
 
4.3.2.5. Sensitive Earth Fault Protection  
Sensitive Earth Fault thresholds are typically set to as low as possible. Due to imbalance 
on the distribution network the recommended minimum setting is 3A with a definite 
time of 3 seconds (Ergon Energy 2014). Sensitive Earth Fault settings are typically time 
and current graded with upstream devices. To accommodate, Sensitive Earth fault 
settings are recommended to start at 8A, 8 seconds at the start of the feeder (Zone 
substation) and reduce by 1A and 1 second progressively on any associated downstream 
devices; an example of this method is shown in Figure 28.  
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Figure 28: Example of Sensitive Earth Fault coordination 
 
 
4.3.3. Benchmarking Settings 
The following sections discuss the results obtained from the SQL queries to examine the 
possibility of benchmarking proposed settings.  
 
4.3.3.1. Benchmarking Overcurrent Thresholds  
The result of the SQL query 1 for the outgoing overcurrent is shown in Figure 29. It is 
evident by the graph that the tripping thresholds range is diverse in value and frequency. 
An excursion of a predefined number of standard deviations from the mean would not 
be indicative of an appropriate threshold. The use of this method to provide a bench 
mark or indicator was found to be inappropriate for the protection setter or checker to 
deem the proposed setting to be correct. 
64 
 
Figure 29: Distribution of Outgoing 11kV Overcurrent tripping thresholds (SQL Query 1) 
 
The result obtained from SQL query 2 for all overcurrent pickups downstream of the 
feeder bay are shown in Figure 30. This returned a skewed distribution of values which 
is indicative to the design or application required by these devices i.e installed where 
protection reach factors are compromised and a line recloser has been installed to 
provide appropriate detection which inturn typically results in a small value of threshold 
magnitude. Similar to the outgoing 11kV anlysis a protection setter or checker could not 
rely on this graph to confirm correctness of the setting however the graph can provide 
an indication of settings that are outside what is typically applied. The example of this is 
the red circled setting (900A)  in  Figure 30. This setting may be appropriate but the 
method provided the ability to flag to the Protection Engineering Manager to investigate 
the reasons for such a large setting.  
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Figure 30: Distribution of downstream 11kV Overcurrent tripping thresholds (SQL Query 2) 
 
4.3.3.2. Benchmarking of Phase Multiplier 
The result of the SQL query for downstream phase multipliers is shown in Figure 31. 
The calculated mean and values within one standard deviation are indicative of the 
typical setting required to be applied to protection IEDs. A proposed setting within this 
range would be deemed appropriate suggesting the method can provide validation for a 
proposed setting and will also identify those settings that outside typical ranges as 
indicated by the red circle in  Figure 31.  
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Figure 31: Distribution of Phase multiplier thresholds (SQL Query 2) 
 
4.3.3.3. Benchmarking Earth Fault Thresholds  
The result of the SQL query 1 for the feeder bay Earth fault is shown in Figure 32. It is 
evident by the graph that the tripping thresholds range is diverse in both its magnitude 
and frequency. The mean value and standard deviation returned values that align with 
Ergon Energy’s protection philosophy. Whereby protection reaches for earth faults is 
calculated using an additional fault impedance of 50Ω.  For an 11kV system with a 50Ω 
fault the highest fault current used for reach calculations is 127A.  Using the standard 
reach factor of 2 the maximum setting is expected to be 63.5A.  
The outgoing feeder results provided a mean of 47.52A and one standard deviation from 
the mean of 16.03A.  One standard deviation above the mean is 63.5A and one below is 
31A.  This query was successful in providing an effective tool to determine a valid 
setting for the earth fault thresholds applied to outgoing 11kV feeder bays.  If the 
proposed setting is within one standard deviation of the mean it is expected to maintain 
appropriate reach.  
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Comparison of the proposed setting to that of values within one standard deviation of 
the mean would provide confidence that the setting is within typical magnitudes. As 
mentioned  previously this method also is able to identify a non-typical setting.  An 
example of this is the red circled setting in  Figure 32. 
 
 
Figure 32: Distribution of Outgoing 11kV Earth Fault tripping thresholds (SQL Query 1) 
 
The result obtained from SQL query 2 for downstream Earth Fault thresholds are shown 
in Figure 33. The results of this query provide a mean of 26A and one standard 
deviation from the mean of 11A. This calculates to a magnitude of 37A for one standard 
deviation above the mean.  The maximum expected threshold applied to the upstream 
protection IED at the substation would be 63.5A.  To provide current grading between 
the upstream and downstream devices, the downstream earth fault threshold would be 
set to 80% of upstream earth fault threshold.  This equates to approximately 50A.  The 
value of 50A is below the preferred 63.5A, therefore would be deemed as an appropriate 
setting.  The result of the SQL query would deem this value not appropriate as it falls 
outside one standard deviation of the calculated mean. This indicates that this query 
would not be an appropriate validation tool for all earth fault settings applied to 
downstream Protection IEDs.  
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The query did demonstrate the method can be used as an indicator identifying those 
settings that are outside what is typically applied as shown by the red circle in Figure 
33. 
 
 
Figure 33: Distribution of downstream 11kV Earth Fault tripping thresholds (SQL Query 2) 
 
4.3.3.4. Benchmarking Sensitive Earth Fault Thresholds 
The result of the SQL query 1 for the outgoing Sensitive Earth Fault is shown in Figure 
34. The calculated mean and one standard deviation is indicative to the typical setting 
applied to an outgoing 11kV feeder and a proposed setting within this range would be 
deemed appropriate. Therefore the results of this query can be used to verify the setting 
applied for SEF applications at bay level as discussed in section 4.3.2.5 and identify any 
non-typical setting.   
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Figure 34: Distribution of Outgoing 11kV SEF tripping thresholds (SQL Query 1) 
 
The result of the SQL query 2 for the outgoing Sensitive Earth Fault is shown in Figure 
34. The calculated mean and one standard deviation are indicative to the typical setting 
applied to downstream protection IEDs and a proposed setting within this range would 
be deemed appropriate on the condition it maintain coordination with the upstream 
device. Therefore the method can provide an indication that the proposed setting is 
within typical magnitudes and will identify those settings that outside what is typically 
applied.  
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Figure 35:  Distribution of downstream 11kV SEF tripping thresholds (SQL Query 2) 
 
4.3.3.5. Benchmarking Outcome 
The aim of this benchmarking was to try and establish the mean and standard deviation 
for critical settings that may be used to critique a proposed setting in the protection 
setting report.  Owing to the topology and the design of distribution feeders the result of 
the analysis for some of the critical settings returned more of an indication than a 
defined value which could be benchmarked against.  
The reason for this is by design a distribution feeder’s conductor sizes and lengths 
change across its entire route in support of network and supply requirements. These 
varying attributes impact on the overall impedance of the line which also varies the 
positive, negative and zero sequence components.  The fault levels calculated are reliant 
on the result of these system impedances and in turn these levels dictate the protection 
reach requirements and the tripping thresholds applied to the protection IED.  Owing to 
this outcome it was consider that there would no advantage to further data mine to 
perform a more granular analysis as described in section 3.3.2.1.  
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4.3.4. Magnitude of change 
Another method examined was to measure the magnitude of change of a proposed for 
an existing installation setting. As described in section 4.3.2 critical criteria for 
determining a setting is the Protection Reach Factor. These reach factors could be used 
in conjunction with the existing setting to validate the proposed setting by analysing the 
magnitude of change. Where the proposed setting value is less than the existing setting 
then a comparison is not required as this would increase the Protection Reach Factor 
providing additional sensitivity for network faults. Where the proposed setting is 
increased a mandatory comparison is undertaken on the premise that protection reach 
may be compromised.  
An example was undertaken by using the data already collected for the downstream 
earth fault tripping thresholds (SQL Query 2) which provided listings of existing setting 
and proposed settings. Where a difference between both setting was identified these 
were captured and imported into an excel spread sheet. Conditional formatting was 
applied to the list of proposed setting to verify whether the increase in magnitude was 
within limits. The conditioning applied assumed the existing setting complied with the 
minimum Protection Reach Factor of 2 (as described in Table 5) for system normal. The 
maximum increase deemed appropriate for an Earth Fault setting would be an increase 
which maintained a Protection Reach Factor of 1.3 for backup applications; a setting 
above this magnitude would require further verification. On this premise the list of 
installed settings were then compared against the following calculation:   
 
Proposed Setting > 
(2 × 𝐼𝑝𝑠)
1.3
 
          (1.4) 
Where:          
 Ips  – Existing Setting 
 
Where this condition calculated as true the installed setting was flagged in red 
prompting further verification.   
Table 6 provides the results of this calculation applied to the downstream 11kV Earth 
Fault elements captured by SQL Query 2.  
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Table 6: Results for magnitude increases using conditional formatting  
Proposed Setting Existing Setting 
22 45 
30 50 
40 50 
40 20 
25 30 
15 20 
15 10 
20 30 
 10 15 
30 25 
20 30 
20 15 
20 13 
45 20 
15 10 
20 30 
40 15 
40 15 
30 20 
 
4.3.5. Frequency of change 
Frequency of change was considered to identify either an inexperience setter was 
delivering settings that were not appropriate for the application or where there may be 
an inherent issue with the application or installation the protection IED was designed to 
protect. The Ergon Energy’s Protection Database System (PDS) was again mined to try 
and identify multiple changes in short succession. The method of the data mine was to 
first identify multiple changes of a single protection IED with an open time internal. 
This found no excessive setting changes to a single device, although an analysis of this 
type proved difficult as to the determination of what is considered as excessive changes. 
However mechanisms to capture each setting change for a single device as a count 
could provide the data to establish a bench mark of an excessive setting.  
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4.4. Development of an improved Configuration delivery process 
Where a discrepancy is identified within the Protection Setting Report, configuration 
file and Protection Setting Request (PSR) confusion lies around which component is the 
correct source of information. The Protection Setting Report is the primary document of 
the workflow and all settings applied to the configuration files and Protection Setting 
Request (PSR) are to be derived from this document.  Improvements to the workflow 
employed a top down approach in order of the Protection Setting Report, configuration 
file and Protection Setting Request (PSR). 
The examination of existing workflow identified only one check point which required 
all three components being checked at the same time. As shown in the initial fault tree 
analysis peer review checks are recent additions. The reviews however are not 
descriptive in the requirements of the checks that should be undertaken to maintain a 
consistent output. It was identified more descriptive steps should be applied to the 
workflow with reference to the generic process (CIGRE Working Group B5.31 2013) 
discussed in section 2.4. Three quality checks are recommended to improve the existing 
Protection Setting Workflow. 
 Quality Check 1 
 Quality Check 2 
 Quality Check 3 
The locations of these checks within the existing workflow are shown in Figure 36 and 
the quality checks required are detailed in the following sections.   
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Figure 36: New Protection Setting Workflow 
 
4.4.1. Quality Check 1 
The existing Protection Setting Report template employed concentrates on the 
calculations and documenting the system configuration that determine the value of 
thresholds and characteristics that are to be implemented.  Methods to verify these 
values have been discussed in Section 4.2. Where the application is considered a 
standard installation all functional, control and indication logic are described in standard 
configuration documentation for the prescribed application. The description of this logic 
will not appear in the Protection Setting Report. In the existing workflow the report is 
created in isolation to the configuration file providing opportunity for these 
discrepancies, while not errors, benefiting from being minimised. 
As part of Quality Check 1 the following key items are recommended to be checked 
with additional attention of those items identified in Appendix C.2 and C.3, but are not 
limited to; 
 Tripping  and Time Thresholds 
o Required Protection Reach Factors are met  
o The intended protection element to be used is correctly documented 
 Time Characteristics 
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o Appropriate time grading is maintained 
o The intended timer is correctly documented 
o The intended time characteristic is correctly documented 
 Control, indication and Functional Logic 
o Review of any non-standard application requirements 
 
The last point is also a consistent discrepancy defined by the progressive survey; and as 
shown in the fault tree analysis in Figure 16 introduction of non-standard control, 
indication and functional logic functions have the potential to increase the overall error 
rate due to the setter or even checker being familiar with adding such features. Ergon 
Energy have implemented standard configuration files which have been tested and 
commissioned and have history of correctness. Implementation of non-standard features 
relies on setter, checker and eventually the field test staff to verify whether they provide 
the intended result. The Protection Setting Report should document the required 
deviations from the standard and the reason that has prompted the implementation of 
non-standard features. Furthermore these non-standard features applied to the Protection 
IED software should be tested and verified to ensure the configuration file is operating 
as design (Standards Australia 2011).  This mechanism is considered to reduce the 
probability of error for these non-standard features from a “Complicated Non-Routine 
task” to a “Routine task with care” within the fault tree analysis in Figure 16. 
 
Section 5.2 describes a new verification method which can provide such verifications in 
a controlled and well documented environment; the latter is particularly import to 
provide the opportunity to continuously improve the workflow. 
 
4.4.2. Quality Check 2 
At this stage of the workflow the protection setter should have identified the firmware 
of the intended Protection IED prior to developing the configuration file.  
One of the predominate responses obtained from the surveys was that requested 
thresholds and time characteristics were not valid settings i.e. there was a discrepancy 
between the final calculated settings as documented in the Protection Setting Report and 
76 
what could be applied the protection IED. This is owing to the Protection IED elements’ 
setting resolutions; meaning the Protection IED will not accept the exact calculated 
value the setter may wish to employ.  In this case the protection setter is required to 
make a judgement on the accepted setting in comparison to the calculate setting. If the 
Protection IED value is deemed acceptable and this change is not reflected within the 
Protection Setting Report a discrepancy now exists. 
To reduce these occurrences Quality Check 2 has been introduced leveraging of the 
comparison features of the vendor’s software and Ergon Energy’s suite of Standard 
configuration files. This check is performed by the setter after Quality Check 1 is 
completed and with recommended actions described in Figure 37. 
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Attach Comparison Report to the Protection 
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NO
 Update  Protection
 Setting Report
 
Figure 37: Recommended action for Quality Check 2 
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4.4.3. Quality Check 3 
At this stage the Senior Protection Engineer is required to approve the Protection 
Setting Request (PSR) considering the information provided by the Protection Setting 
Report and configuration file. The required checks at this stage are:  
 The PSR is verified against the comparison report of the configuration ensuring 
all applied elements and settings of the Protection IED are present. 
 Any change in control, indication and functional logic is checked for; 
o Correctly documented in the Protection Setting Report in comparison to 
the configuration file  
o A specification has been developed to enable testing of the non-standard 
features applied to the Protection IED.  
 The correct firmware is identified and documented 
 
4.4.4. New Protection Setting workflow analysed 
The new Protection Setting workflow was then analysed using the same techniques 
outlined in section 4.1.  
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Figure 38: Fault Tree analysis for new Non-Standard configuration delivery 
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Figure 39: Fault tree analysis of the new Standard configuration delivery 
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4.4.5. Results of Fault Tree Analysis 
Figure 38 and Figure 39 show the change in the probability of errors for both the non-
standard and standard. The injection of the prescribed quality checks in Section 4.4 
provides a configuration delivery error probability of approximately 0.6%. When 
compared to the analysis of the existing workflow with a probability error in the range 
of 22.36 % to 33.36%; the recommendations provide the opportunity to significantly 
improve configuration development using the new workflow.  
 
4.5. Chapter Summary 
The chapter examined the effectiveness of the existing workflow and by doing so 
identified the root causes of configuration delivery. A new work flow was developed 
and its improvements were also analysed with a favourable outcome.  Methods to verify 
and validate protection settings applied to the Basic IED types were analysed to 
determine their effectiveness to be used as validation techniques for power system 
settings.  
Those methods that were found effective could be employed using the existing 
Protection Database System (PDS) or introduced as part of reporting capabilities within 
a Configuration Management System (CMS). The reporting could be structured around 
those methods discussed reducing the need for a continual check, allowing more 
concentration on those system settings that are unique due to the design of the 
distribution network. It is recommended the use of such tools should be regularly 
audited to ensure they have not been compromised and are still effective in manner in 
which they were intended (CIGRE Working Group B5-09 2006).   
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Chapter 5 
 
 
Remote Delivery of Protection IED Configurations 
 
This chapter discusses the assessment of a remote configuration process against the 
regulatory and legislative requirements imposed on Distribution Network Service 
Providers (DNSPs) with respect to testing of protection IEDs; combined with the 
examination and assessment against traditional processes used to verify Protection IED 
configuration files to be installed into the Basic IED type devices.  
 
5.1. Traditional Configuration Management and Delivery 
Historically a configuration was considered fit for purpose once it had been written to 
the device intended for service and validated using secondary injection to apply 
sinusoidal voltages and currents. This approach typically identified issues such as: 
i. Consistency issues between PSR, setting file and Protection Setting Report 
ii. Unintended feature interaction introduced by implemented functional logic 
iii. Unexpected operation of the Protection IED for application settings 
iv. Failure of the Protection IED to operate (testing of device hardware i.e. A/D 
converters and IED I/O) 
 
Items (i) to (iii) directly relate to the Protection IED’s software which encompasses the 
aspects of configuration application. These tasks are currently undertaken across 
multiple workgroups within Ergon Energy and in some cases across extended time 
periods.  
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Item (iv) relates to the Protection IED hardware which in essence is the devices ability 
to operate when called upon. Item (iv) could be considered to be independent of the 
configuration management approach as a robust configuration delivery process would 
not be expected to create physical inoperability of a Protection IED. Item (iv) is 
managed by maintenance and monitoring processes (Zimmerman 2014).   
 
5.1.1. Traditional Delivery Process for Protection IED Configurations  
The existing configuration management system typically has the protection and field 
test staff working together to implement Protection IED configurations.  The traditional 
delivery process of a protection IED configuration file is shown in Figure 40. A detailed 
description of each component of the process is discussed in the following sections.  
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file 
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 Configuration 
file allocated 
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written to device
Tested Configuration 
Extracted
Approved Configuration 
Return of 
extracted as commissioned
 in service Configuration file
 
 
Figure 40: Traditional delivery process for Protection IED configurations 
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5.1.1.1. Configuration file development 
The responsibility of the protection setter is to develop configuration files by selecting 
the appropriate file template and applying the required modifications based on the 
application. Improvements to this aspect of configuration management have been 
investigated and addressed in section 4.3. 
 
5.1.1.2. Configuration file allocated within PDS 
The configured file is identified as per standard naming conventions and stored in Ergon 
Energy’s Protection Database systems (PDS) for engineering approval. Once approved, 
the configuration file is issued for installation.  
 
5.1.1.3. Field Test PC 
A field Test person extracts the approved file from the Protection Database System 
(PDS) to a test PC. The field Protection IED’s make, model and installed firmware is 
confirmed against the issued documentation and configuration file to ensure 
compatibility prior to uploading the configuration file. 
 
5.1.1.4. Field Protection IED under Test 
The field Protection IED’s make, model and installed firmware is confirmed against the 
issued documentation and configuration file to ensure compatibility prior to uploading 
the configuration file.  
 
5.1.1.5. On-Site Configuration file delivery  
The issued configuration file is downloaded to the Protection IED using vendor 
software. Injection testing of the configuration is undertaken. On completion of the 
testing the configuration file is extracted from the Protection IED to the Test PC. A 
comparison between the issued and extracted file is performed and where discrepancies 
and found they are reported to the protection setter.  Where a file comparison reports no 
discrepancies the extracted file is identified as per the standard naming convention and 
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the configuration file along with the completed Protection Setting Request (PSR) is 
returned to the protection setter.  
 
5.1.1.6. Returned Documentation and Configuration file 
On receipt of the extracted configuration file and completed PSR, the protection setter 
performs a comparison of the issued and extracted files to confirm no discrepancies 
exists and if correct, the extracted file is then imported into the Ergon Energy’s PDS and 
recognised as the commissioned / in service file; and is used as the reference file for 
future reconfigurations. 
 
5.2. Remote Configuration Management and Delivery  
 
5.2.1. Overview 
Implementation of a remote configuration delivery process meant an alternate 
verification method was needed to ensure that best practice is maintained. To sustain 
similar verification methods the setting development stage was expanded to incorporate 
laboratory testing of the configuration files emulating the tasks outlined in sections 
5.1.1.3, 5.1.1.4 and 5.1.1.5.  The proposal is to test the proposed configuration in an 
identical device to that in the field. Once the new process was developed an evaluation 
against current practices was undertaken. An overview of the expanded process is 
shown in Figure 41. 
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Figure 41: Overview of the change in configuration delivery 
 
5.2.2. Remote Delivery of Protection IED Configurations  
During development of the new delivery process an anomaly was found with a Basic 
Protection IED installed on the Ergon Energy network. The anomaly was found not to 
impede the Protection IED’s ability to operate for network faults but would impact on 
the ability to verify the installed configuration file via a remote delivery process.  The 
failure mode identified would modify an extracted file, meaning that if the extracted file 
was download to the Protection IED and retested, it would provide different results 
compared to the original configuration test (see case study in Appendix E.1). 
Leveraging off the case study and existing traditional delivery methods an improved 
process was developed changing the current techniques of how the issued and extracted 
files are verified and managed.  
The traditional delivery emphasis is on the extracted file becoming the master file on 
completion of the configuration delivery.  The case study in Appendix E.1 found the 
extracted configuration file was not a complete representation of the installed 
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configuration file.  To correct this error a manual change to the setting file would be 
required, which if performed, suggests the file is no longer the tested in service file.  If 
left uncorrected, the extracted file (master) contains an error. Under the traditional 
process the master file is kept and used for future reconfigurations of the Protection 
IED.  The design of the new delivery process eliminates the occurrence.   
The process for file verification is shown in Figure 42 and is as follows: 
∆SL is representative of any changes that are introduced as part of the file download 
process. These errors are identified when the file is tested using traditional means in the 
LAB test device. 
∆TL is representative of any changes that are introduced by the extraction of settings 
from the LAB IED under test. 
∆SF is representative of any changes that are introduced by downloading the 
configuration file to the field IED. These changes cannot be explicitly measured. 
∆TF is representative of any changes that are introduced by the extraction of settings 
from the field IED. This is not explicitly measureable. 
Ideally all of the ∆ values will be zero (representing no change) during the upload and 
download process.  
The file in the field IED is deemed to be the same as the intended file provided that 
∆TL = ∆TF and the injection test in the laboratory proves that no ∆SL has occurred. Any 
corruption that has occurred on the download or upload to the field IED that was not 
evident on the device under test, would be indicative of a remote configuration problem. 
This would mean that the extraction process between the two devices did not match 
∆TL ≠ ∆TF. The download process between the two devices did not match ∆SL ≠ ∆SF. 
Alternatively both the download and upload process did not match. A case may exist 
where the download and upload from the field IED created and then corrected an error 
in a configuration file. This was deemed an improbable scenario as the download and 
subsequent upload corruption would be of the same master file used in the laboratory 
and would have to create and then correct an error over a communications system that 
employed error checking. 
An additional check ∆TL = ∆SL may be performed to ensure vendor performance (e.g. 
download and upload are the same) however this check is not one that would help 
identify the remote configuration delivery was successful. 
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Once a successful verification has been confirmed (∆TL = ∆TF)  ∆SL  is considered the 
master file.  This process is deemed to be more robust compared to that of the 
traditional delivery method as it maintains a master configuration file that is free of 
error. An overview of new process is shown in Figure 42 with the following sections 
describing each step. 
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Figure 42: Remote delivery process for Protection IED configurations 
 
5.2.2.1. Configuration file development 
There is no change to this step as described in section 5.1.1.1.  
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5.2.2.2. Configuration file allocated within PDS 
The configured file is identified as per the standard naming convention and stored in 
Ergon Energy’s Protection Database System for engineering approval. Once approved, 
the configuration file is issued so that it may be installed.  
5.2.2.3. Test PC 
This case the test PC is loaded at a centralised test facility. The test PC is operated by 
personnel who are knowledgeable in the operation and functionality of protection IEDs 
under test. It is envisage field test personnel would undertake testing at the centralised 
facility following all requirements under Standard Work Practice (SWP) SP0518.  
The issued configuration file which is written to the laboratory based protection relay 
under test shall remain the primary (master) configuration file for the duration of the 
configuration delivery process. 
 
5.2.2.4. Laboratory Protection IED under Test 
This stage involves tests to validate the software, settings or both as well as ensuring the 
software does not perform any unintended functions or operations once installed into the 
Protection IED (Standards Australia 2011). Verification that Protection IED under test 
is the same as the intended field Protection IED is essential. The two devices need to be 
from the same vendor and have consistent model numbers and firmware versions.  
In addition to those tests prescribed in Standard Work Practices (SWP) SP0518 an 
additional check is required. This check shall consist of injection of balanced 3 phase 
sinusoidal voltages and currents simulating load conditions. This is to confirm that for a 
configuration delivery that the Protection IED does not respond abnormally on receipt 
of the configuration file, further confirmation of an expected response during the 
delivery process.  
To ensure that the settings are not modified by the upload process the setting files will 
only be deployed in one direction for application as shown in Figure 42.  The 
configuration at this stage will be: 
 Provided by the setting developer to the setting tester 
 Downloaded to the device under test 
 Tested to ensure that the configuration performance is as expected 
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On successful completion of testing the configuration file is now extracted and is 
allocated as the configuration delivery ‘Check’ file. At this stage the primary (master) 
configuration file is ready to be written to the remote device. 
 
5.2.2.5. Operational and functional checks 
The following operational checks shall be undertaken prior to configuration delivery; 
 Record the operational state for protection control functions e.g. SEF enabled, 
A/R enabled 
 3 phase load measurements shall be recorded and compared against the proposed 
overcurrent setting. This is to migate the risk of a mal-operation for an 
inappropriate threshold with respect to load conditions 
 
The following functional checks shall be undertaken prior to configuration delivery;  
Functional Software – 
Functional software checks are used to confirm that the Protection IED to receive the 
new configuration file is an exact match as the Lab Protection IED with respect to; 
 Manufacturer Make 
 Manufacturer Model 
 Firmware version 
 
Functional hardware–  
Functional hardware checks are used to establish hardware health of the protection IED. 
These checks should confirm the Protection IED; 
 Is not exhitbiting a self-monitoring alarm event e.g. watchdog alarm  
 Displays correct analogue values confirmed by examination of one or more of 
the following;   
o Vendor software and SCADA values 
o An upstream  Protection IED  
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5.2.2.6. Configuration Delivery Stage 
The tester, using the same laboratory based test PC, remotely connects to the field 
Protection IED and downloads the master configuration file. When the vendor software 
reports that the primary file has been delivered an extraction of the configuration file 
contained within the field protection IED is performed and is allocated as the ‘Field IED 
Check’ file. At this stage of the process there are two Check files available; one 
obtained on completion of testing the laboratory Protection IED as described in section 
5.2.2.3  and the other from the field Protection IED. These files are now compared with 
each other to identify any discrepancies. 
A successful comparison of the two extracted check files suggests both the laboratory 
Protection IED under test and the remote protection IED have responded in a similar 
manner for the same operation. 
The primary (master) configuration file and the field Protection IED Check file are now 
compared to identify discrepancies prior to returning the primary file to Ergon Energy’s 
PDS as the in service configuration file. Where discrepancies are identified they are to 
be evaluated and documented. Both check files are now discarded. 
 
5.3. Comparison against Traditional processes 
To assess the success of the remote process a comparison between it and the traditional 
delivery processes was undertaken with reference to Ergon Energy’s SWP SP0518; the 
requirements of each component which the remote process was assessed against has 
been reproduced at the start of each subsection. A comparison of the strengths and 
weaknesses of each process is listed in Table 18  in Appendix F. 
 
5.3.1. Overview  
Section 6.4 of SWP SP0518 describes the basic testing philosophies that should be 
employed in relation to setting changes to a protection relay. It is acknowledge that the 
existing testing methods have historically been employed to provide the appropriate 
verification of both the setting applied and relay operation. The purpose of this section 
is to examine and benchmark the remote process outlined in section 5.2 to the 
applicable requirements of testing described in SWP SP0518; with an overview of these 
requirements shown in Figure 43.  
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Figure 43: Related SWP SP0518 testing philosophies 
 
5.3.1.1. Changes to Relay Logic 
SWP SP0518 states: 
“There is a requirement to fully retest a protection relay when a functional 
logic change is made.”  
 
The remote delivery process has bounded the protection relay type to the Basic 
Protection IED which is typically subjected to configurable pickup and time 
characteristics. However recent introduction of functional logic has been extended to 
these devices. 
The laboratory testing is able to confirm that applied functional logic is operating as 
expected and the application of the logic has not introduce any feature interaction with 
any other enabled function of the Protection IED. The technique of testing a laboratory 
protection IED of the same make, model and firmware version of the field protection 
IED ensures the software is operating as intended; and if proven correct, it is expected 
the hardware of the field protection IED will respond in the same manner as the LAB 
Protection IED. 
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5.3.1.2. Enabling a new element in the relay 
SWP SP0518 states: 
“There is a requirement to fully retest a protection relay when enabling a 
new element.” 
 
This is in response in determining whether the implementation of the new element has 
introduced an unexpected operation or unwanted interaction with other protection 
elements and associated features. The remote delivery process is committed to fully 
retesting the changed configuration within a laboratory environment proving the newly 
enabled element has no impact on the existing configuration file.  
 
5.3.1.3. Downloading a new configuration to a relay 
SWP SP0518 states: 
 “When downloading a new configuration file to relay, all functions must be 
re-tested. An exception to this is when no new functions are being added 
(for example a pickup change only) and the relay software has a “compare” 
function to verify that no file corruption on download has occurred.” 
 
The remote process provides the capability to retest the configuration file in its entirety 
using a test Protection IED of the same make, model and firmware version as the 
intended field protection IED; with all tests performed complying with all the SWP 
SP0518; including verification and comparison of the configuration file delivered to the 
remote Field Protection IED.  The design of the remote process provides the additional 
benefit in identifying abnormalities as described in Appendix E.1. 
 
5.3.1.4. Changes to a particular element characteristic 
SWP SP0518 states: 
 “this requires retesting of the modified element only. Coupled with this will 
be a “compare” to verify the change has been successfully applied to the 
relay and no file corruption has occurred” 
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The remote process uses test methods outlined in SWP SP058 and again a full retest of 
the installed configuration file is undertaken fulfilling this requirement.  
    
5.3.1.5. Changes to a particular setting threshold 
SWP SP0518 states: 
 “in a digital relay, this does not require retesting of the modified element. 
However a “compare” is required to verify the change has been 
successfully applied to the relay and no file corruption has occurred.” 
 
By design a single setting change via remote access may not always be possible and 
may require a group of settings to be delivered to the protection IED at the one time. 
The remote process has been designed to support such deliveries and it is recommended 
that the same process of verification is performed whether there is a single or multiple 
changes applied to the configuration file.  The remote process encompasses verification 
and comparison techniques which successfully fulfils this requirement. 
  
5.4. Acknowledgement of Regulatory and Legislative Requirements 
 
5.4.1. Electricity Act 1994 
A Distribution Network Service Provider (DNSP) must protect its supply network to 
ensure a safe connection and supply to its customers and also comply with any 
directives outlined in the National Electricity Rules (Electricity Act, Queensland, 1994 
n.d.)  
Clause Division 5 (a)(i) of the Electricity Act 1994 states a distribution entity must 
comply with the National Electricity (Queensland) Law and the National Electricity 
Rules (NER) and; Provide a safe, maintained and protected supply to its customers and 
reinforces compliance with the NER.  
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5.4.1.1. Assessment against the Electricity Act 1994  
The laboratory testing discussed in section 5.2.2 prior to the delivery ensures the 
configuration file for the protection IED is operating as designed and is in accordance 
with Ergon Energy protection philosophy collectively ensuring that once the 
configuration installed the protection IED is capable of detecting power system faults 
maintaining a safe network.  
During a remote delivery of configuration files there is a possibility to impact on 
network reliability owing to how protection IED responds to network disturbances 
during the configuration delivery. The exposure is dependent on how a Protection IED 
may respond to the following events; 
 Loss of communication between the remote terminal and the protetion IED 
during remote configuration delivery 
 Response to faults which occur during configuration delivery 
 Response to configuration delivery during normal supply load  
 
Chapter 6 of the dissertation examines such events. The verification and delivery 
described in Chapter 5 ensures the delivery process does not contravene the Act. 
 
5.4.2. National Electricity Rules (NER) 
Distribution Network Service Providers must also maintain a compliance program to 
ensure that its protection systems operate reliably (National Electricity Rules). 
5.4.2.1. Assessment against the National Electricity Rules (NER) 
A compliance program is typically addressed by periodic maintenance which is based 
on industry experience of Protection IED / relay failure rates.  
A Protection IED that is maintained under such programs present a low risk of hardware 
failure. To protect against the event of a hardware failure Ergon Energy’s protection 
philosophy is to implement backup protection reach for distribution reclosers complying 
with Clause S5.1.9 (c) of the NER.  Where backup protection reach is provided to the 
Protection IED under reconfiguration and in the event of hardware failure during the 
remote configuration delivery the feeder is not without protection and is to be isolated 
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for a fault. This capability maintains a safe network and continues to comply with the 
NER and the Electricity Act 1994.    
However by design an operation of an upstream Protection IED isolating more of the 
network then would normally be required is not desirable from a reliability perspective. 
It would be advantageous to ensure that backup protection reach exists prior to a 
download of a configuration. 
Confirmation of backup protection reach is not expected to impose any additional 
workload to the process. This check would be carried out as part of the protection feeder 
review undertaken to issue the required change in configuration. 
      
5.4.3. Electrical Safety Regulation 2013 
Electrical Safety Regulation 2013 Part 11- Safety management systems Section s234, 
part 3(b) states; 
“(3) When a prescribed electricity entity’s safety management system is first 
put into effect or is modified, the entity must give the regulator— 
(b) a certificate in the approved form from an accredited  Auditor that 
verifies the safety management system has been assessed and validated to 
ensure the system comprehensively identifies and addresses the hazards and 
risks associated with the design, construction, and the operation and 
maintenance of the entity’s works”  
 
In addition, Division 2 – Earthing and Protection, Section s198 – Performance and other 
requirements for works, part (h) states; 
“The following requirements apply for the works of an electricity entity— 
(h) electrical equipment intended to form part of the works of an electricity 
entity must undergo commissioning tests and inspection to verify that the 
electrical equipment is suitable for service and can be operated safely when 
initially installed or altered”. 
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5.4.3.1. Assessment against the Electrical Safety Regulation 2013  
Section s234 highlights the need to obtain and review Ergon Energy’s safety 
management system to assess the hazards and risks that are documented especially 
around design, operational and maintenance of the entity’s works to ensure the project 
objectives are compliant with what is currently lodged with the regulator. The remote 
process does not impact on Ergon Energy’s safety management system as the process 
will be maintained and operated under the same systems currently employed.   
The following describes the methods employed to comply with Division 2, Section 
s198, part (h) of the Electrical Safety Regulation 2013; 
The Remote Protection IED Configuration Delivery described in section 5.2.2 applies to 
a Protection IEDs which are already in service, have been commissioned and found to 
be suitable for service. Configuration changes are considered as changes to the software 
which operates and controls the Protection IED. During a setting change the remote 
protection IED’s hardware connection is not altered and it is expected to operate in the 
same manner as determined at the time of commissioning.  
A software change is still required to be tested to ensure the new configuration is fit for 
purpose and does not introduce unwanted feature interaction. The process developed for 
remote configuration delivery, will test and commission the configuration file verifying 
the configuration file operates as designed and as intended (Standards Australia 2011).   
 
5.4.4. DR AS 2067:2014  
F6.12 Protection relays and systems 
“Consistent with the high degree of dependability required, protection 
relays and systems should be proven to function correctly at commissioning 
and at regular intervals. These tests should involve the injection and 
measurement of operating quantities and should totally prove the system by 
direct or simulated means.” (Standards Australia 2014) 
 
F6.13 Verification of relay settings; 
 
“Verification of relay settings by secondary current and voltage injection 
and measurement is necessary. Reliance for correct operation should not 
depend on settings established solely by downloading settings or by 
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positioning dials and plugs. The injected current or voltage must have 
sinusoidal wave shape and the measurements must be by calibrated 
instruments.” (Standards Australia 2014) 
 
 
5.4.4.1. Assessment against DR AS 2067:2014  
In response to DR AS 2067:2014 Draft for Public Comment Australian Standard, 
Appendix F - Power System Protection, Section F6.12 Protection relays and systems: 
Ergon Energy processes for commissioning and maintaining protection schemes aligns 
with the draft clause with all Protection IEDs being tested and commissioned prior to 
placing them into service. Regular maintenance programs are implemented on those 
Protection IEDs located in substation environments.  
The remote delivery process is intended to replace commissioning programs for Basic 
IEDs. Commissioning processes remain intact and are still performed on-site using 
traditional testing methods to confirm the Protection IED’s operation. The intent of the 
remote delivery process is to support remote configuration changes that do not alter the 
interaction between the Protection IED’s software and hardware. The tests performed 
involve injection of sinusoidal voltages and currents proving that the software 
component of the Protection IED is operating as intended and is fit for purpose. 
Therefore it is considered that the remote delivery process discussed in this dissertation 
would not be non-compliant to draft clause F6.12 
 
In response to DR AS 2067:2014 Draft for Public Comment Australian Standard, 
Appendix F - Power System Protection, Section F6.13 Protection relays and systems: 
This clause prompted careful consideration in progressing with the remote configuration 
delivery process owing to the suggestion that protection related functions should be 
tested using traditional methods of injecting sinusoidal voltages and currents.  The 
proposed process tests the new configuration by installing it into a Protection IED of the 
same make, model and firmware of the proposed field based Protection IED; and 
applies sinusoidal waveforms to test its operation.  
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5.5. Chapter Summary 
The chapter has identified the Remote Configuration delivery Process shown in Figure 
42 improves upon traditional verification methods and do not impose non-compliance 
with the presribed Legislative and Regulatory requirements; including existing Ergon 
Energy standard work practices .  
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Chapter 6 
 
 
Response to Remote Configuration 
 
This Chapter details the laboratory testing of a selected Basic IED to assess how it 
responds to remote reconfiguration and considered external influences that may occur 
during remote delivery.  
 
6.1. Testing of Remote configuration delivery  
The elements under test were those deemed most likely to be changed during a 
reconfiguration process. It was also important to understand whether an element / 
setting change is completed as a single change or whether change is delivered as part of 
a group of settings. This will depend on the manufacture’s software design which 
further strengthens the need to understand the setting change process for all Protection 
IEDs subjected to remote delivery. 
 
6.1.1. Selected Basic IED 
The Basic IED selected for testing was the NOJA RC10 Controller which is fitted to 
NOJA’s line of automatic regulators.  A flow chart describing the Basic IED’s response 
for a reconfiguration of the active setting group is shown in Figure 44. An active setting 
group describes a collection of protection thresholds that are ‘active’ and are used by the 
Basic IED to detect network faults. Typically Protection IEDs have multiple protection 
groups but only one group may be active at any one time. The ACR under test has four 
available setting groups.  The Ergon Energy standard applications for the Basic IED 
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only permit the use of two groups. One group is used for system normal conditions, and 
the second typically used for contingency arrangements. 
 
Configuration 
file is Sent to 
Noja controller 
Configurati
on uploaded 
is held and 
compiled 
ensuring 
received 
configuratio
n file is 
complete
New settings 
Issued to the 
controller’s 
processor’s 
database 
allowing 
settings to take 
affect 
Existing settings 
remain active 
and operational
All protection 
timers are reset 
at the time of 
new settings  
download to 
processor’s 
database
No Change
Controllers Response during delivery
Configuration delivery to 
Active setting Group
O
p
er
at
in
g
 i
n
 p
ar
al
le
l
New settings are 
now in service
 
Figure 44: The response of the Protection IED for configuration file upload 
 
6.1.2. Considered Responses of the Protection IED  
With the availability of two setting groups it was deemed appropriate to understand how 
both operated during a configuration delivery operation. After discussions with the 
manufacturer the tests were designed to explore the responses of both the active and the 
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inactive setting groups. By design, configuration delivery of a single setting to the tested 
Protection IED Controller is not possible, meaning a group of settings are required to be 
delivered at the one time.  
The expected responses as described by the manufacturer are; 
1) During configuration of an ‘active’ group the response of the controller is to;   
 Reset all active timers associated with the active group,  
 Apply any reconfigured tripping thresholds,  
 Maintain protection throughout the complete configuration delivery.   
2) During reconfiguring of an ‘inactive’ group the response of the controller is to;   
 Not reset any timers. 
 Have no impact on the ‘active’ group settings ensuring that existing protection 
thresholds and time characteristics remain in service and operational. 
 Maintain protection throughout the complete configuration delivey   
These responses suggest that no delay of tripping could occur during the delivery of the 
configuration when delivery is to the inactive group. 
 
6.1.3. Test Environment 
The testing was performed using a desktop computer located in Toowoomba and the 
recloser controller located in Townsville. Sinusoidal voltages and currents were 
simulated for recloser secondary injection. A series of remote downloading 
configuration were completed to assess the response of the controller during considered 
influences. This configuration delivery used the same communication medium currently 
used by Ergon Energy to provide engineering access to remotely connected Protection 
IEDs; with the intent to simulate the same process that will be used for future 
configuration deliveries.  
 
6.1.4. Tests Performed  
The tests performed were to confirm the controller’s response as outlined in section 
6.1.2 as well as to identifying operational risks. The protection elements tested were 
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those deemed typical of a required setting change on the 11kV distribution network and 
included; 
 Overcurrent Thresholds and Time characteristics; 
 Earth Fault Thresholds and Time characteristics; 
 SEF Thresholds and Time characteristics. 
 
6.1.4.1. Considered Operational Influences 
The Basic IED was also tested to assess its response to; 
 Communication failure of download whilst the device is operating under normal 
load conditions; 
 Communication failure of a download and a network fault after a 
communication failure; 
 A configuration download completed whilst the controller is operating for a 
network fault. 
 
6.1.5. Controller’s Response  
Table 7 and Table 8 outline the conditions the configuration delivery was subjected to 
and the controller’s response for the active and inactive group respectively. Simulated 
network faults applied were Overcurrent, Earth Fault and Sensitive Earth Fault (SEF). 
 
Table 7: Summary of Protection IED’s response for the active group settings 
Network State Test Performed Device Response 
3 Phase balanced load  
Configuration remotely 
delivered - overcurrent 
thresholds below load 
Remained stable, 
operated as expected 
Simulated Network Faults 
Delivery of a Configuration 
file with no changes to any 
enabled protection functions   
All elements retested  
& remained 
operational and 
unaffected  
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Network State Test Performed Device Response 
3 Phase balanced load  
Loss of communication 
during configuration 
delivery 
Remained stable  
Simulated network faults 
Retest after previous loss of 
communication test to 
ensure protection remained 
operational  
No effect on the 
existing settings, 
operated as expected 
Simulated network faults 
Loss of communication 
during configuration 
delivery 
All elements 
unaffected, 
operated as expected  
Simulated network faults 
Configuration taken affect 
whilst a protection timer is 
active  
Delayed tripping was 
experienced  
(expected operation) 
Simulated network faults 
Configuration taken affect 
whilst a protection tripping 
threshold is active  
Delayed tripping 
occurred 
(expected operation) 
 
Table 8: Summary of Protection IED’s response for the inactive group settings 
Network State Test Performed Protection IED’s Response 
3 Phase balanced load 
Configuration remotely 
delivered - overcurrent 
thresholds above load 
Controller’s ‘active’ group 
settings remain stable 
Controller’s ‘active’ group 
settings remain stable 
Simulated network faults 
Delivery of a 
Configuration file with 
a change in the 
‘inactive’ group’s 
protection functions   
‘Active’ group Protection is 
maintained and operates as 
configured. No effect on the 
SG1 settings, operated as 
expected.   
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6.1.6. Testing Outcomes 
The recloser operated as per the flow chart outlined in Figure 44.  The testing confirmed 
it would be unlikely that a mal-operation or a mis-operation would occur during a 
remote configuration delivery for the Basic IED under test. However the effect of the 
delay tripping should be considered during the risk evaluation for this Basic IED. When 
a change in configuration is made, the testing highlighted that a change in one element 
effects all other elements associated with the group.  
For example if a overcurrent element is reconfigured and downloaded to the protection 
IED during a network earth fault the earth fault timer will reset if the configuration 
takes effect before the timer can expire. 
If the earth fault is still detected the timer starts again which delays the protection trip. 
The extent of the additional time was found to be dependent on when the configuration 
file takes effect within the Protection IED.  
 
6.1.6.1. Example of delayed Tripping 
The IED under test was configured with the existing setting listed in Table 9.  A 
simulated earth fault was injected into the controller to confirm the expected operating 
times. The inverse IDMT earth fault characteristic is shown in Figure 45 with an 
expected time of 7.02 seconds for 50A injection. 
Table 9 : Protection IED settings 
Protection 
Element 
Existing Setting Required setting 
Tripping 
Threshold 
TMS/ 
Delay 
Timing 
Characteristic 
Tripping 
Threshold 
TMS / 
Delay 
Time 
Characteristic 
Overcurrent  75A 0.7 IDMT Inverse 75A 0.9 IDMT Inverse 
Earth Fault 25A 0.7 Inverse No Change 
SEF 7A 7s N/A No Change 
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Figure 45: Expected operating time for the applied Earth Fault 
 
Figure 46 shows a measured time of 7.1138 seconds (red circle) captured by the 
injection test set. 
 
Figure 46: Actual operate time for the applied Earth Fault setting 
 
A second configuration download was performed with changes as listed in the required 
settings column of Table 9. At the same time the configuration was delivered, a 
simulated Earth fault of 50A was injected into the Protection IED. The configuration 
was delivered and took effect before the time characteristic could expire resulting in the 
operated time being extended.  The delay in tripping is shown in Figure 47; increasing 
the trip time to 11.345 seconds, which imposed an additional delay of 4.322 seconds. As 
demonstrated the effect of this occurrence is cumulative and as previously discussed and 
is dependent on when in the timer’s cycle the configuration takes effect.  
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Figure 47: Actual delayed tripping time for the applied Earth Fault setting 
 
6.1.7. Mitigation of the exposure to delayed tripping 
To try and mitigate or reduce the occurrence of the delay tripping the hierarchy of 
hazard controls, in Figure 48 were considered. 
 
 
Figure 48: Hierarchy of Hazard Control (Ergon Energy 2010) 
 
The first method considered was to send the proposed configuration file to the 
Protection IED’s setting group 2 (SG2) and when delivery is complete controlled 
switching is undertaken to switch setting groups (i.e. SG1 to SG2) providing an 
engineering control to the problem.  However this solution would introduce confusion 
amongst personnel that interact with these devices on a regular basis, owing to the 
historical processes that maintain setting group (SG1) as the primary setting group.  To 
address any form of confusion, administrative controls would need to be implemented 
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to prevent setting group 1 (SG1) being inadvertently reinstated.  Although this process 
would be effective to eliminate the delayed tripping at the time of delivery, the 
operational risk arises again during the switching between groups. It was deemed that 
the considered control measures would not provide any additional reduction of the risk.  
Another considered approach was to examine existing protection elements contained 
with the protection IED that could be used to accelerate tripping for a network fault. The 
testing undertaken demonstrated that the time taken to deliver the setting was irrelevant.  
The delay trip will occur if the new configuration has taken effect at the time a 
protection timer is running.  Implementation of this solution would also require 
administration controls and was deemed to provide no further benefit. 
Elimination of the occurrence would be the preferred result.  To obtain such an outcome 
power utilities will need to engage with Protection IED manufacturers to discuss and 
promote changes to how a Protection IED responds to online setting changes.   
 
6.2. Chapter Summary 
This chapter describes the tests undertaken to evaluate a Basic IED’s response to a 
simulated remote delivery of a configuration file with the testing highlighting the 
possibility of a delayed tripping occurrence a during network faults.   Methods of hazard 
control to reduce or eliminate the occurrence were discussed including their 
effectiveness in reducing the hazard. 
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Chapter 7 
 
 
Operational Risks  
 
This chapter discusses the operational risks and the level of risk each operational risk 
imposed onto the distribution network including methods that are recommended to be 
employed to maintain or reduce risk. 
Considered risks associated with the network: 
 Device identification 
 Delayed tripping 
 Inadvertant trip operation 
 Communication failures 
 
7.1. Device Identification 
Appropriate identification methods are required to ensure that the correct Basic IED 
requiring modification is being communicated too. Download of a configuration can 
create the following operational risks; 
 Operation of the ACR for normal system conditions- owing to a overcurrent 
threshold which is too low for the normal load current of the protected feeder.  
 Inadequate Protection Reach Factors – an incorrect threshold value has the 
potential to reduce Protection Reach Factors introducing an unsafe condition for 
the network during a fault event. 
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To reduce the occurrence of this happening, it is recommended that the Basic IED’s 
identity should be verified by two persons, which introduces a secondary check 
procedure (Heggie 2015). To reduce the consequence, the presence of backup protection 
for the Protection IED under reconfiguration is also recommended. The fault tree 
depicted in Figure 49, provides the probability for an incorrect connection to the Basic 
IED.  The probability is determined to less than 10% and using Ergon Energy’s Risk of 
Likelihood table (Table 21 Appendix G.3) a category of rare was determined for the 
event. The consequence category of the event was determined as moderate (Table 22 
Appendix G.4); considering backup protection would be employed for an undefined 
period of time; the level of risk was determined using Table 19 in Appendix G.1  with a 
summary of  the outcome displayed in Table 10. 
 
Protection IED connection error
Incorrectly 
Identifying 
switchgear 
Serial No.
Incorrect select
0.1
Check List Inspection
Incorrectly 
Identifying Unique 
operating 
name
0.001
0.1
Check List Inspection 0.1
Check List Inspection
Checker
0.1
Check List Inspection
0.0001
  
Figure 49: Probability error – Protection IED connection error 
 
Table 10: Level of Risk – correct Protection IED connection  
Likelihood Consequence Level of Risk 
Rare Moderate Low 
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7.2. Delayed Tripping 
As discussed in Chapter 6, the possibility of a delayed trip does not introduce any risk 
of mis-operation; however conductor damage and decreased reliability was are possible 
impacts imposed on the network for this occurrence.  
 
7.2.1. Conductor Damage 
 As part of the design of an appropriate overcurrent protection characteristic the setter is 
to consider conductor damage and the cumulative heating effects of automatic reclosing 
of the ACR. The design requires overcurrent protection to be set with an operating time 
that does result in conductor heating above the maximum operating temperature that 
would cause annealing of the conductor. If a delay trip occurs, then one trip cycle of the 
ACR’s auto reclose operation is affected, with either delayed tripping or the fault 
cleared by the upstream backup protection. As the conductor damage is calculated on 
the accumulated clearing time, the slower clearing time now becomes part of the 
accumulated time which was not considered in the original design. However it is 
considered this occurrence would be similar to that of a circuit breaker fail operation 
where backup protection would also be required to isolate the fault. Circuit breaker fail, 
is considered an acceptable network contingency owing to the rare occurrence of circuit 
breaker fail events. 
 
7.2.2. Decreased Reliability  
During delay tripping the reliability of the network can be affected as time grading 
designed during the setting development stage has been compromised owing to the 
Basic IED resetting all protection timers. Distribution feeders typically operate with 
IDMT characteristics due to their radial topology. To provide appropriate fault 
discrimination along the entire length of the feeder the Basic IED’s protection elements 
are designed with minimum timing margins typically in the order of between 350 – 400 
milliseconds. Resetting these timers whilst running compromises these margins and can 
cause the upstream device to operate; isolating larger portions of network then is 
required. Figure 50 demonstrates an example of a designed grading margin between the 
Protection IED under test and an upstream backup protection setting.  On detection of 
the fault both Protection IEDs will initiate their timing elements and owing to the 400 
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milliseconds grading margin the Protection IED (red curve line) downstream operates 
before the upstream Protection IED’s (blue curve line) timer expires. In cases where the 
downstream Protection IED does not isolate the fault in time, the upstream Protection 
IED timer is allowed to expire operating its associated circuit breaker or ACR. The 
worst case for extended trip time occurs when the new configuration takes affect just 
prior to the earth fault timer expires; the trip time is now extended by another 7 seconds. 
The time characteristic (black line) in Figure 50 demonstrates the time is extended to 14 
seconds for the worst case.  
 
 
Figure 50: Demonstrated delay tripping and grading margin between downstream and upstream 
Protection IEDs 
 
7.2.3. Risk Probability 
Testing performed in Chapter 6 confirmed delivering the configuration with a change in 
protection setting introduces the possibility of delay tripping. The length of delay is 
dependent on when the new configuration takes effect.  If the configuration takes effect 
whilst a protection timer is half way through its cycle, then the delay tripping will be 
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increased by approximately half of the timer’s value. For delay tripping to occur there 
needs to be a coincidence of events.  The EG-0 Power System Earthing Guide (Energy 
Networks Association 2010) provides methods of calculating the probability of such 
events; where the configuration file delivery overlaps the occurrence of a fault event 
detected on the distribution feeder. 
 
7.2.3.1. Traditional Delivery 
Delivery to a configuration at site traditionally requires the ACR to be isolated from the 
network which entails high voltage switching and isolating the Protection IED to ensure 
inadvertent tripping does not occur. The procedure is to temporarily replace the ACR’s 
Protection IED with bypass fuses which are incorporated into the design.  To perform 
the bypass, three expulsion dropout fuses are sequentially closed to bypass the ACR.  
During this operation the Protection IED is blocked to avoid operation of the earth fault 
protection. Once all three fuses are installed the recloser is opened. On opening of the 
ACR it becomes isolated form the network and the configuration file is then delivered to 
the Protection IED. On completion of the works the process is undertaken in reverse to 
reinstate the ACR to its normal operational state.  The procedure prevents an 
interruption to the customers downstream of the ACR. 
ACR Switching times were collected from SCADA and it was possible to identify the 
time from when the ACR was isolated to the time the ACR was open to complete the 
works. On average the time taken to complete one operation was 436.5 seconds. 
  
7.2.3.2. Remote Delivery 
After pre-delivery checks have been completed (as outlined in section 5.2.2.5) the 
configuration will be delivered to the remote Protection IED with the ACR’s protection 
remaining in service for the entire process. For the configuration file to take affect the 
processor has had to acknowledge that the file is complete in its structure. For the IED 
under test this appeared to be instantaneous, however in calculating the coincidence 
probability, a conservative time of one second was used.  
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7.2.3.3. Coincidence Probability 
The coincidence probability was calculated for both the remote and the traditional 
delivery methods to benchmark between the two work practices.  Calculations were 
conducted using the following formula (Energy Networks Association 2010); 
 
 
Pcoinc = 
fn × pn × (fd+pd) × T
 365 × 24 × 60 × 60
 × CRF 
          (7.1)
4
 
Where: 
 pd is the average duration of the average exposure (in seconds) 
 fd is the average duration of the average fault (in seconds) 
 pn is the rate at which the exposures occur (exposures or presence/year) 
 fn is the rate at which faults occur (faults per year) 
 T is the number of years (exposure duration) = 1 year 
 CRF is Coincidence reduction factor (set to 1 normally) 
 
To determine the value for fn the average of faults/100km/year for the Urban, short and 
long categories for distribution feeders were reviewed.  Owing to a higher number of 
faults recorded the Urban category shown in Table 11 was the worst case scenario. The 
calculated average for the Urban category was 13.24 faults/100km/year. The mean 
length of an urban distribution feeder was calculated to be 6.6km (Figure 51) which was 
used to provide a ratio of events where the mean length was found to less than 100km.  
  
 
 
 
                                                 
4
 (Energy Networks Association 2010) 
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Table 11: Distribution feeder length exposure by type (Ergon Energy 2011/2012) 
 
 
 
Figure 51: Urban distribution feeder lengths on the Ergon Energy network 
 
Table 12: Values of variables used in calculating Coincidence probability 
Variable 
Value 
Comment 
Traditional Remote 
pd 872s 1s 
The traditional time was doubled owing to 
the  exposure occurring twice during the 
delivery process  
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Variable 
Value 
Comment 
Traditional Remote 
fd 0.2s - 8.0s 0.2s - 8.0s 
The probability was plotted over a range of 
operate times; where 0.2 s is the fastest 
operate time for a SI IDMT time 
characteristic typically employed; and 8s 
which is the longest operate time typically 
employed for SEF 
pn 1 1 
A setting change of once a year was 
considered 
fn 
0.8738 
and 
3.5748 
0.8738 
and 
3.5748 
fn = (
13.24
100
) ×6.6  (Avg km feeder length) 
and  
fn = (
13.24
100
) ×27  (Longest km feeder length) 
 
T 1 year 1 year (Energy Networks Association 2010) 
 
The coincidence probability for the average urban feeder for both the traditional and 
remote delivery process were plotted to determine whether the remote delivery 
operation imposed a higher probability of incidence. As shown in Figure 52 the 
probability of remote delivery had a lower probability of delay tripping by three orders 
of magnitude.  
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Figure 52: Coincidence probability comparison - average urban feeder length 
 
A second comparison was undertaken to consider the longest urban feeder of 27km (see 
Figure 51) with the results displayed in Figure 53. It also provided a reduced magnitude 
of probability; of two to three orders of magnitude. 
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Figure 53: Coincidence probability comparison - longest urban feeder length 
 
The results of these plots identified that the likelihood of a delayed tripping during the 
remote delivery process was extremely low and imposed no additional adverse effect. 
These values were aligned with Ergon Energy’s Risk of Likelihood table (Table 21 
Appendix G.3) to establish a category of likelihood for the occurrence. The 
consequence was considered minor owing to the network remaining protected 
throughout the procedure (Table 22 Appendix G.4); with the level of risk determined 
using Table 19 in Appendix G.1  with a summary of the outcome is displayed in Table 
13.  
 
Table 13: Level of Risk - delay tripping occurrence 
Likelihood Consequence Level of Risk 
Rare Minor Very Low 
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7.3. Inadvertent Trip Operation 
The act of writing a configuration file to a Protection IED will not cause a mal-
operation (Pingping & Guo 2014) however there is a possibility that an inadvertent trip 
operation can occur when; 
 
 The designed overcurrent setting threshold is above the load current measured 
by the Protection IED; typically referred to as a overload trip. 
 The ACR’s phase sequence is opposite to that configured within the new setting 
file; and a Negative Phase Sequence (NPS) overcurrent element has been applied 
for additional backup reach requirements. On delivery of the configuration file 
the Protection IED would detect NPS current for normal load conditions; and if 
the standing load was above the NPS current threshold a trip would occur. 
 
The consequence considered for this event was a reduced reliability of supply; 
impacting on other safety related infrastructure used within the community e.g. traffic 
lights. The probabilities were aligned with Ergon Energy’s Risk of Likelihood table 
(Table 21 Appendix G.3). The likelihood of this occurrence was deemed to be rare 
owing to the operational pre-delivery checks undertaken in section 5.2.2.5. The 
consequence was considered moderate owing to the impact to the reliability of supply 
(Table 22 Appendix G.4). The level of risk has been determined using Table 19 in 
Appendix G.1  and a summary of the outcome is displayed in Table 14. 
 
Table 14: Level of Risk - inadvertent trip operation 
Likelihood Consequence Level of Risk 
Rare Moderate Low 
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7.4. Communication Failures 
In assessing the operational risks for communication failures four faults have been 
considered; 
 Failure of the computer used to connect and send the configuration file, 
  The availability of the communication medium connecting the computer to the 
device 
 Hardware / electrical failure of the equipment used to provide the 
communication link 
  and failure of the Protection IED itself.   
The Ergon Energy’s Communication Operational Network Centre was contacted to 
obtain availability figures on communication connectivity between the corporate 
network and the population of Basic IEDs installed on the distribution network. Figures 
obtained for the January – March quarter for the connectivity between the 
communication centre and each Protection IED connected to their prospective 3G 
modems was calculated to provide a mean availability rate of 98.32% for 1200 Basic 
IEDs as shown in Figure 54 .  
 
 
Figure 54: Communication availability for pole mounted Basic IEDs  
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Although these four faults are probable, the outcomes of communication failure testing 
described in Chapter 6 resolves them from imposing an operational risk. When a 
configuration file is being delivered to a Protection IED and a communication failure 
occurs for any of the four reasons above, testing proved that there would be no ill effect 
to the Protection IED. The configuration was either received or not received.  This was 
owing to the check process undertaken by the Protection IED prior to the configuration 
taking effect. Where the remote station is unable to verify the state of the Protection 
IED in a timely manner then there is a likelihood that the communication module at the 
ACR has failed. Where this has occurred field crews would be despatched to carry out 
repairs. When communications become available a remote verification can be 
undertaken to confirm the state of the configuration. 
 
7.5. Summary of Operation Risks 
A summary of the operational risks, their risk rating and control measures 
recommended are provide in Table 15. 
  
Table 15: Summary of the risk rating for remote configuration delivery 
Operational Risk Risk Rating Control Measures 
Protection IED 
Identification 
Low 
 Delivery process as described 
in section 5.2.2.5 
 
Delayed Tripping Very Low 
 Confirmation backup 
protection is provided for the 
reconfigured Basic IED 
Inadvertent trip Low 
 Pre-delivery checks as 
described section 5.2.2.5   
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7.6. Operational Considerations 
Table 16 describes the overview of the how, what, where and why that is recommended 
to design and create the required checklists, to assist in the decision making for remote 
delivering of configuration files. 
Table 16: Considerations in developing remote delivery checklists 
Questions 
to ask 
Requirements to consider 
How 
The method to deliver remote configuration has been described 
in Chapter 5 and should be used to maintain the testing and 
verification requirements needed when a Protection IED is 
reconfigured remotely.  
 
What 
Ergon Energy’s Protection Database System currently 
documents the elements and timers that need to be applied to the 
Protection IED.   The introduction of a remote delivery process 
will require the ability to record whether the configuration 
delivery was performed by traditional or remote delivery 
processes.  This will provide a method to track the effectiveness 
of the delivery process and facilitate continual improvements 
(Standards Australia 2011).  
Where 
This is also performed by the existing Protection Database 
System (PDS) identifying the Protection IED’s location on the 
distribution feeder, including which zone substation it originates 
from. The location of the Protection IED can also help establish 
areas where communication connectivity is poor.  With this 
knowledge, decisions can made not to proceed with remote 
delivery further reducing the possibility of interrupting the 
verification process failure outlined in Chapter 5.     
When 
To further reduce any incident of delayed tripping and 
communication failures, the remote configuration delivery 
should not be performed during inclement weather (Pingping & 
Guo 2014) or when programmed works are being undertaken on 
the distribution feeder associated with the Protection IED.  
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Questions 
to ask 
Requirements to consider 
Why 
The ‘why’ is captured in PDS for traditional delivery methods.  
However a detailed description of the reasons for the change is 
not mandatory as it is typically described within the Protection 
setting report. Introduction of any new process requires the 
ability to analyse, measure and improve the process outcomes. 
Reportable descriptive details of why the remote configuration 
was undertaken, has the opportunity to provide valuable 
information to improve the configuration delivery workflow.  
Who 
Persons who perform the delivery of configuration files to 
remote Protection IEDs should be (Standards Australia 2011); 
 Authorised to peroformed the task 
 Familiar with the Protection IED, its software and its 
response to remote configuration 
 Part of a controlled group within the company to 
perform such operations. 
 
7.7. Chapter Summary 
The chapter identifies the level of risk associated with each consider operational risk in 
relation to the Basic IED; including control measures to maintain or reduce the 
exposure. The evaluation of the operational risks highlighted the importance of 
understanding how the Basic IED responds to remote configuration delivery whilst in 
service. The learning’s of this chapter will provide the basis for future assessments of 
other Basic IEDs that require reconfiguring using the same process.   
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Chapter 8 
 
 
Feasibility of Remote Configuration 
 
For any organisation a perceived benefit of implementing new processes is there will be 
efficiency gains through increase productivity and ultimately providing financial 
benefits. Other reasons power utilities have been reluctant to progress with remote 
management has been whether the investment would be cost beneficial owing to 
(CIGRE Working Group B5-09 2006); 
 The frequency of setting changes  
 Data infrastructure is to expensive where equipment is located in isolated areas 
and rough terrian.  
Since the start of 2015, 153 setting changes have been issued to Ergon Energy field staff 
to reconfigure Basic IED devices, all of which have connectivity to facilitate remote 
configuration delivery.  As the infrastructure required for the remote management 
process already exists, the following sections discuss the comparison of the associated 
costs between the traditional and remote delivery processes, to reconfigure a Basic IED.  
    
8.1. Costs of Traditional delivery 
To ascertain the current cost of changing a setting on an ACR installed on Ergon 
Energy’s network a data extraction from the Protection Database System (PDS) was 
undertaken concentrating on ACRs that were subjected to a reported setting change.  
The results were then cross referenced with Ergon Energy’s works planning database to 
further categorise the setting changes into the following groups; 
 TC – Test and Commission i.e. Capital Works 
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 MC – Maintenace Corrective i.e Planned works 
 MF – Maintenance Forced i.e. Unplannned works 
 
The result returned a total of 818 PSRs issued under the three categories. PSRs issued 
under a MF category were further analysed owing to these typically requiring 
immediate action to correct identified issues on the distribution network; prompting a 
single task being issued to field test staff.   
107 PSRs were issued under the Maintenance Forced (MF) category. These 107 were 
further categorised into actual labour hours taken to complete each task. This returned a 
range of hours from 0.5 hours – 40 hours. On the premise that a remote change would 
be expected to take approximately 4 hours, setting changes costed in excess of 8hrs 
were further analysed. To obtain an average cost for a setting change on ACR, the 
captured work orders were divided into their allocated ‘cost types’ of; 
 Resource Cost – Labour and Accommodation 
 Material Cost – Parts required to perform the task 
 Equpment Cost – Vehicle allocation 
 Other Cost – Company Overheads 
To identify the cost imposed on a daily basis each works order was divided into groups 
of; 
 ≤8 hours  
 12<Actual>8 hours 
 16<Actual>12 hours 
 24<Actual>16 hours 
The results are provided in the following figures.  
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Figure 55 provides the associated costs to complete a setting change on a Basic IED for 
≤8 hours.   
 
Figure 55: Costs associated with a setting change (MF) – 1 Day 
 
Figure 56 provides the associated costs to complete a setting change on a Basic IED for 
12<Actual>8 hours. 
 
Figure 56: Costs associated with a setting change (MF) – 1.5 Days 
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Figure 57 provides the associated costs to complete a setting change on a Basic IED for 
16<Actual>12 hours. 
 
 
Figure 57: Costs associated with a setting change (MF) – 2 Days 
 
Figure 58 provides the associated costs to complete a setting change on a Basic IED for  
24<Actual>16 hours. 
 
 
Figure 58: Costs associated with a setting change (MF) – 3 Days 
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These hours vary across the work undertaken owing to the distance of travel and staff 
operating under strict fatigue management policies. Some locations can take up two 
days of travel to arrive at the worksite.  
Of the cost types listed, resource and equipment costs are where saving can be made 
with the introduction of a remote configuration process. Table 17 summarises the 
average resource and equipment costs associated with each allotted group. The average 
of the results presented in Table 17 equates to an average cost of $954 ≈ $1000.00 and 
on average 13.5 man hours to change a setting on an ACR. 
 
Table 17: Summary of costs for allotted groups 
Day/s 
Average 
Hours 
Average 
Resource 
Cost 
Average 
Equipment 
Cost 
Average Total Cost 
(Resource and Equipment Costs 
Combined) 
1 8.2 $627.00 $73.00 $700.00 
1.5 10.75 $795.00 $146.00 $941.00 
2 16.10 $618.00 $86.00 $704.00 
3 22.0 $1395.00 $79.00 $1474.00 
 
8.2. Cost of Remote delivery  
The process outlined in section 5.2 describes a new method of configuration delivery to 
the Basic IED incorporating laboratory testing and remote delivery of the configuration 
file. It is proposed field test technicians would be used to test and deliver the 
configurations. The expected time to perform a setting change on a Basic IED is 
expected to take approximately 4 hours, equating to a labour cost of $208.00. 
Comparing this value with the average cost of the traditional delivery provides the 
opportunity to
 
reduce the delivery cost by approximately 80%.  
The recent installation of 487 ACRs under a reliability project further highlights the 
potential for significant cost savings. Owing to the short installation time frame of these 
pole mounted Protection IEDs, 244 of these units have been installed as Load Break 
Switches (LBSs) with a future expectation to be reconfigured to ACRs. Exercising the 
existing process in section 5.1 to reconfigure these units would be at cost of 
$232,776.00 compared to $50,752.00 using the process described in section 5.2. 
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8.3. Chapter Summary 
The chapter identifies the cost of using traditional delivery methods to reconfigure the 
Basic IED type devices and provided a comparison between it and the proposed remote 
configuration delivery process against future reconfiguring of installed Automatic 
Reclosers (ACRs).  The results demonstrated opportunities of improved cost 
efficiencies with progressing with a remote configuration management strategy. 
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Chapter 9 
 
 
Conclusions & Further Work 
 
9.1. Conclusions 
The main objective of the project presented in this dissertation was to determine 
whether a remote configuration management process could be developed to reduce on-
site commissioning and operational works on the existing population of Protection IEDs 
installed on the Ergon Energy network.  By the use of the defined processes it was 
determined configuration files can be remotely delivered to a selected Basic IED whilst 
it remains in service, without imposing an increase in operational risks to the 
distribution network. 
In addition to the main objective, a number of other objectives were set and achieved.  
These included:  
 Analysing Ergon Energy’s existing configuration workflow to firstly determine 
its effectiveness in delivering an error free configuration, and secondly identify 
where improvements could be made, 
 Examination of benchmarking techniques, frequency and magnitude changes 
that could be used to verify proposed protection settings,  
 Recommendations to improve the existing workflow,  
 Understand the operational risks associated with remote configuration delivery 
by testing the response of  a selected Protection IED during a simulated delivery.  
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Improvements to the existing workflow were achieved by implementing targeted 
checklists and mandatory testing of non-standard functional logic which collectively 
theoretically reduced discrepancies in configuration files exiting the Protection Setting 
workflow. To assess whether these suggested improvements are successful the 
recommended checklists will need to be implemented and the output of the workflow 
measured and compared against the error values discussed in section 4.4. 
The assessment of the alternate verification process against the prescribed legislative, 
regulatory and Ergon Energy standards did not identify non-compliance towards the 
requirements of testing installed Protection IEDs. Furthermore assessment against 
traditional delivery methods found the alternate process to be more robust in its ability 
to verify successful deliveries of configuration files. Future implementation of the 
proposed remote delivery process also identified opportunities to improve operational 
efficiencies providing opportunities to reduce Ergon Energy’s operational expenditure 
(OPEX).   
Collectively the objectives provide the knowledge and understanding to progress further 
development of a remote configuration strategy for Basic IEDs installed on a 
distribution network. 
 
9.2. Further Work 
Owing to time constraints it was not possible to investigate or implement all areas 
identified at the commencement and during the project. These areas have been 
identified as future works to internally progress remote configuration management of 
Basic and Intermediate Protection IEDs installed on Ergon Energy distribution network. 
These areas include: 
 
1) Deliver the findings of the project to Ergon Energy management and 
relevant stakeholders to discuss the project findings.  
2) Develop and publish the LAB documentation as described in Chapter 5 
and commence trails testing and verifying new configuration files to 
assess the process 
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3)  Implement recommendations to improve the Protection Setting 
workflow and continue to monitor the progressive survey to measure the 
improved output.  
4) Further investigation into the responses and operational risks of remote 
configuration delivery where a proposed configuration file intends to 
impose a change in protection application; concentrating on 
reconfiguring installed LBSs to ACRs. 
The following are area of further work may be investigated by other students;  
5) Further development and assessment to determine whether the processes 
can be expanded to functional logic changes and the additional 
identifying requirements around the verification process. 
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Appendix A Project Specification 
 
Topic: Remote Management of Safety Systems in Power Utility Installations 
Supervisor: Dr Leslie Bowtell BEng, MEng, PhD USQ 
Rob Coggan, Engineering Manager Substations Standards, Ergon Energy (Industry 
Supervisor) 
Sponsor: Ergon Energy 
Project Aim: The aim of this project is to investigate the systems, processes and 
design criteria that will facilitate remote management of protection and control 
infrastructure used within Power Utilities.  
Programme:  
(Version B, 24 September, 2015) 
1) Identify existing work flows of Ergon Energy’s current configuration 
development and research the effectiveness of current management strategies 
through analysis of survey and internal non-conformance logs 
 
2) Investigate methods for setting verification 
 
3) Design a new IED configuration delivery process and analyse its efficiency and 
effectiveness against existing processes established in (1). 
  
4) Research and evaluate an alternate method to support remote configuration 
verification of selected protection IEDs used on the Ergon Energy network. 
 
5) Research and test how selected IEDs respond to configuration delivery whilst 
remaining in service.  
 
6) Development of risk matrix to be used for remote configuration delivery 
 
As time permits: 
7) Introduce the improved configuration management process into Ergon Energy’s 
protection design work flow for selected IEDs and progressively resurvey the 
same staff to evaluate the new workflow.  
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Appendix B: Probability Tables 
 
B.1 Probability Error Rates 
The following tables were used to apply errors of probability to the fault tree analysis 
described in Chapter 4 (Engineering Australia 2012). 
 
Figure 59: Probability of human error rates -1 
 
Figure 60: Probability of human error rates -2 
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Figure 61: Probability of generic failure rates 
 
 
Figure 62: Probability of general breakdown failure rates  
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Appendix C: Survey Questions and Results 
 
Survey questions developed and delivered to Ergon Energy’s Field Test Staff are listed 
in section Appendix C. The respondents were asked to rank the ‘origin’ and ‘type of 
error’ for each feature they had deemed to have a discrepancy. The results of the more 
granular questions are displayed in section C.3.  
C.1 Perception Survey Questionnaire 
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C.2 Progressive Survey Questionnaire 
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C.3 Perception Survey Results 
C.3.1 Origin and Type of Errors for Tripping Threshold 
 
Figure 63: Perception Survey - The 'origin' of Tripping Threshold errors 
 
 
Figure 64: Perception Survey - The 'type of error' for Tripping Thresholds 
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C.3.2 Origin and Type of Errors for Time Characteristics 
 
Figure 65: Perception Survey - The 'origin' of Time Characteristic errors 
 
 
Figure 66: Perception Survey - The 'type of error' for Time Characteristics 
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C.3.3 Origin and Type of Errors for Control or Indication 
 
Figure 67: Perception Survey - The 'origin' of Control or Indication errors 
 
 
Figure 68: Perception Survey - The 'type of error' for Control or Indication 
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C.3.4 Origin and Type of Errors for Device Firmware 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 69: Perception Survey - The 'origin' of Firmware errors 
 
  
Figure 70: Perception Survey - The 'type of error' for Firmware 
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Appendix D: SQL code used for Benchmarking  
 
The is the SQL Code developed to enable data mining of Ergon Energy’s Protection 
Database System (PDS) as described in section 3.3.2.  
D.1 SQL code for SQL Query 1  
SELECT PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.PSR_ID, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.STATUS, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_VOLTAGE.VOLTAGE, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.ITEM_NAME_1, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_APPLICATION.APPLICATION_DESC, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_MANUFACTURERS.MANUFACTURER, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.REQUIRED_SETTING, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_GROUP.SETTING_GROUP_NO AS 
SETTING_GROUP_NO1, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP.RC_MAP, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_PROTECTION_TYPES.NAME, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SUB_TYPE.SUBTYPE, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.SETTING, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.SLOT_TYPE, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.RELAY_ID, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.ACTIVE, 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TYPE.RELAY_TYPE_ID 
FROM PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.TEMPLATE_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.TEMPLATE_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.SLOT_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_VOLTAGE 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_VOLTAGE.ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.VOLTAGE_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_APPLICATION 
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ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_APPLICATION.APPLICATION_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.APPLICATION_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_ID 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.RELAY_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_ID.ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_MANUFACTURERS 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_ID.MANUFACTURER_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_MANUFACTURERS.MANUFACTURER_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.PSR_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.PSR_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_GROUP 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.SETTING_GROUP_NO = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_GROUP.SETTING_GROUP_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.ERGON_NAME_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP.ERGON_NAME_ID 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.TYPE_ID      = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP.TYPE_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SUB_TYPE 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.SUB_TYPE_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SUB_TYPE.SUBTYPE_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_PROTECTION_TYPES 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.TYPE_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_PROTECTION_TYPES.TYPE_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TYPE 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TYPE.RELAY_TYPE_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_ID.TYPE_ID 
WHERE (PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.STATUS           = 'Approved' 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.STATUS               = 'Completed' 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.STATUS               = 'Finalised' 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.STATUS               = 'Issued') 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_VOLTAGE.VOLTAGE   = 11 
AND (PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_APPLICATION.APPLICATION_DESC LIKE 
'%DISTRIBUTION%' 
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OR PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_APPLICATION.APPLICATION_DESC LIKE 
'%RECLOSER%') 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_GROUP.SETTING_GROUP_NO = 1 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP.RC_MAP                  = 'OC PICKUP' 
AND (PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SUB_TYPE.SUBTYPE              = 'STAGE 1' 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SUB_TYPE.SUBTYPE                = 'IDMT' 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SUB_TYPE.SUBTYPE                = 'OC') 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.SLOT_TYPE         = 'RLFLD' 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.ACTIVE            = 'Y' 
AND (PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TYPE.RELAY_TYPE_ID            = 1 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TYPE.RELAY_TYPE_ID              = 4 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TYPE.RELAY_TYPE_ID              = 3 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TYPE.RELAY_TYPE_ID              = 2) 
 
To find the outgoing 11kV feeder Earth Fault and Sensitive Earth Fault tripping 
threshold settings the following code replaced the Overcurrent SQL code within the 
outline boxes. 
 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP.RC_MAP                  = 'EF PICKUP' 
AND (PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SUB_TYPE.SUBTYPE              = 'STAGE 1' 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SUB_TYPE.SUBTYPE                = 'IDMT' 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SUB_TYPE.SUBTYPE                = 'EF') 
 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP.RC_MAP                  = 'SEF PICKUP' 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.SLOT_TYPE         = 'RLFLD' 
 
 
  
164 
D.2 SQL code for SQL Query 2 
SELECT PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.PSR_ID, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.STATUS, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_VOLTAGE.VOLTAGE, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.ITEM_NAME_1, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_APPLICATION.APPLICATION_DESC, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_MANUFACTURERS.MANUFACTURER, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.REQUIRED_SETTING, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_GROUP.SETTING_GROUP_NO AS 
SETTING_GROUP_NO1, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP.RC_MAP, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_PROTECTION_TYPES.NAME, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SUB_TYPE.SUBTYPE, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.SETTING, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.SLOT_TYPE, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.RELAY_ID, 
  PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.ACTIVE 
FROM PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.TEMPLATE_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.TEMPLATE_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.SLOT_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_VOLTAGE 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_VOLTAGE.ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.VOLTAGE_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_APPLICATION 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_APPLICATION.APPLICATION_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.APPLICATION_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_ID 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.RELAY_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_ID.ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_MANUFACTURERS 
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ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_ID.MANUFACTURER_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_MANUFACTURERS.MANUFACTURER_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.PSR_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.PSR_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_GROUP 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.SETTING_GROUP_NO = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_GROUP.SETTING_GROUP_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.ERGON_NAME_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP.ERGON_NAME_ID 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.TYPE_ID      = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP.TYPE_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SUB_TYPE 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.SUB_TYPE_ID = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SUB_TYPE.SUBTYPE_ID 
INNER JOIN PROTMAIN.PROT_PROTECTION_TYPES 
ON PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING.TYPE_ID  = 
PROTMAIN.PROT_PROTECTION_TYPES.TYPE_ID 
WHERE (PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.STATUS         = 'Approved' 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.STATUS             = 'Completed' 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.STATUS             = 'Finalised' 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_PSR.STATUS             = 'Issued') 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_VOLTAGE.VOLTAGE = 11 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_APPLICATION.APPLICATION_DESC LIKE 
'%RECLOSER%' 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_GROUP.SETTING_GROUP_NO = 1 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP.RC_MAP                  = 'OC PICKUP' 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.SLOT_TYPE         = 'RCFLD' 
AND (PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.RELAY_ID             = 134 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.RELAY_ID               = 4766 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.RELAY_ID               = 3444 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.RELAY_ID               = 4567 
OR PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_TEMPLATE.RELAY_ID               = 5386) 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.ACTIVE            = 'Y' 
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To find to the downstream 11kV feeder Earth Fault and Sensitive Earth Fault tripping 
threshold settings the following code replaced the Overcurrent SQL code within the 
boxed outline. 
 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP.RC_MAP                  = 'EF PICKUP' 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.SLOT_TYPE         = 'RCFLD' 
 
 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_RC_MAP.RC_MAP                  = 'SEF PICKUP' 
AND PROTMAIN.PROT_RELAY_SETTING_SLOT.SLOT_TYPE         = 'RCFLD' 
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Appendix E: Case Study 
 
E.1 Case Study –Extracted Configuration Discrepancy 
This case study highlighted an area of deficiency with the existing configuration 
management process during verification of a configuration file.  
During routine works to extract a configuration file from a manufacturer’s ‘X’ 
Protection IED a discrepancy was found within the configuration file. The configurable 
file allocates and publishes push button controls and alarm lamps to the Protection 
IED’s HMI. The reported discrepancy was missing functional logic that is used to 
identify incorrect phase sequence during recloser commissioning.  
In attempt to correct the discrepancy, the missing logic was re-applied to the 
configuration file and the file was written to the device on the premise that the logic had 
been inadvertently removed during commissioning testing. Once uploaded to the 
Protection IED, a comparison between the upload configuration file and extracted 
configuration file was undertaken. The comparison identified the discrepancy had 
returned.    
To further evaluate the effect of the error, the issued configuration file was uploaded to 
a test relay and the function in question tested to determine whether it was operating as 
configured.  
The testing found the configured function worked and operated as intended. When the 
configuration file was extracted from the test relay, saved as the extracted configuration 
file, and compared with the off line configuration file, the function was again omitted 
from the extracted file. The extracted file was then rewritten to the protection IED and 
the function retested to determine whether it was operational; and determined it was 
again omitted from the Protection IED. 
The tests undertaken confirmed when the configuration file containing required feature 
was written to the Protection IED, the feature was received and would take effect. 
However when the configuration file is extracted from the Protection IED the function 
is not published to the extracted file.  
This failure not to publish all features to the extracted configuration file questions the 
suitability of the traditional delivery process to be used to perform emote delivery 
verification; as the extracted configuration file from the Protection IED does not 
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represent the configuration that has been upload. The traditional delivery process places 
importance on the extracted file being identified as the commissioned/ in service 
configuration.   
Under the traditional delivery process the extracted file would need to be corrected 
external to the Protection IED prior to storing the file into Ergon Energy’s PDS. This 
would involve manual manipulation of the setting file and would introduce the 
possibility of further human error and would no longer be considered as the in-service, 
tested configuration file. 
 
E.2 Case Study Outcome 
The manufacturer was contacted and believed it was an incompatible firmware issue. 
The Protection IED’s firmware was corrected and the discrepancy was no longer 
repeatable. The case study highlighted a number of items;  
 Steps within the Protection Setting workflow regarding the comparison of 
configuration files are not being adhered to   
 The importance of the approved configuration file  
 Re-evaluating the importance of the extracted configuration file. 
 An extracted configuration file that is placed into the Protection Database 
System (PDS) may not be representative of the actual installed configuration. 
 
  
169 
Appendix F: Comparison Table 
 
F.1 Benefits of the new verification process 
Table 18 provides a strength and weakness comparison between the existing delivery 
and management process and the alternate process described in sections 5.1 and 5.2. 
Table 18: Comparison of configuration management processes 
Process Strengths Weaknesses 
 
Traditional Configuration 
Management and delivery 
(Section 5.1) 
 
 The configuration 
file is 
independently 
tested for error 
with both the 
hardware and 
software 
components of the 
protection IED 
tested. 
 Protection setting 
changes effectively 
imposes 
maintenance action 
of the protection 
IED. 
 
 Unable to monitor 
whether the 
processes 
developed to help 
mitigate possible 
errors during 
import process into 
vendor software is 
adhered too. 
 Travel and Site 
access required 
 Delays in 
Configuration 
delivery  
 
New Configuration 
Management and delivery 
(Section 5.2  
 
 Expedited delivery 
of settings 
especially for 
critical operational 
requirements 
 Consistent and 
traceable error 
reporting can be 
undertaken 
 Test staff have 
immediate access 
to the Protection 
setter 
 
 There is an 
expectation the 
protection IED to 
be reconfigured is 
part of scheduled 
maintenance 
program. 
 Removes 
opportunity for 
non-scheduled 
hardware health 
verification  
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Process Strengths Weaknesses 
 Expedited response 
to errors from 
protection setter 
owing to a reduce 
time period 
between the issuing 
of configuration to 
when testing is 
undertaken  
 Less travel 
requirements for 
staff 
 Improved learning 
environment for 
less experienced 
test staff 
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Appendix G: Risk Assessment 
 
G.1 Personnel safety/Risk Assessments 
The risk assessments provided account for the two components relating to the project. 
The first assessment identifies hazards related to testing of the remote configuration 
using the remote relay rack. To perform these types of activities it is mandatory that an 
Ergon Energy Daily Task Risk Assessment Plan (DTRMP) be completed to help 
determine the risk of personnel injury based on the matrix outlined in Table 19. These 
daily risk assessments identify the associated hazards and the control measures needed 
to be implemented to maintain a safe work site. When required assessments will be 
completed prior to work and will address the activities required. 
Table 19: Internal DTRMP “Level of Risk” indicator (Ergon Energy 2013) 
Consequence 
Likelihood 
Rare Unlikely Possible Likely 
Almost 
Certain 
Catastrophic Medium High High Extreme Extreme 
Major Medium Medium High High Extreme 
Moderate Low Medium Medium High High 
Minor Very Low Low Medium Medium Medium 
Insignificant Very Low Very Low Low Medium Medium 
 
The proposed testing is to be performed in a test laboratory which will involve injection 
of lethal currents and voltages into a test box that will simulate the primary power 
system to the basic IED. The electric shock consequence has been rated ‘major’ owing 
to the seriousness of receiving a shock however the likelihood of receiving a shock has 
been classed as ‘rare’ owing to the leads connected to the relay are fully insulated and 
work will be performed from a remote location where the test equipment is already 
installed.  
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Using the above DTRMP this produces a risk of medium.  Although the testing will be 
in a controlled environment to further control this risk constant communication with an 
employee located in the test laboratory will be employed during the required tests to 
ensure all personnel are clear from the area and operation of equipment is as expected.  
G.2 Project Risk Assessment 
G.2.1 Task Risks 
Table 20 outlines those components of the project though theoretical may impact on the 
time line of the project.  These risks have been identified and methods of mitigation 
have been described.  
Table 20: Project risk assessment 
Task Hazard Initial Risk Minimisation New Risk 
Level 
Field Survey 1 
Surveys not 
completed 
HIGH 
Discussions 
with field staff 
supervisors 
have been 
undertaken to 
develop support 
for the survey 
to be 
completed. 
MEDIUM 
Field Survey 2 
Surveys not 
completed 
HIGH 
Create email 
list of field staff 
and send 
reminders on 
fortnightly 
basis.  
 
MEDIUM 
Use of SQL 
query software  
Understand the 
SQL program and 
tables available 
within Ergon 
Energy’s 
MEDIUM 
Source expert 
advice within 
Ergon Energy’s 
Protection 
group 
LOW 
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Task Hazard Initial Risk Minimisation New Risk 
Level 
protection 
database to 
extract the 
required data to 
provide initial 
bench marking 
results  
Bench 
Marking of 
Protection 
settings 
Accessing 
between  Ergon 
Energy’s 
protection 
database and the 
Asset 
management tool 
to provide a more 
granule approach 
for bench 
marking studies  
HIGH 
Source expert 
advice within 
Ergon Energy’s 
Asset 
management 
group  
MEDIUM -
LOW 
Testing  of 
Basic IED 
responses to 
setting 
changes 
Access to 
required 
protection IED 
and test 
equipment 
HIGH 
Communication 
with lab test 
panels already 
establish and 
test software 
and equipment 
also available 
LOW 
 
 
 
G.2.2 Project Consequential Effects 
 
The primary focus of this project is the development of processes that can further 
improve methods of interaction with Ergon Energy’s suite of protection IEDs. There is 
174 
an expectation from my industry supervisor that the project outcomes from this 
dissertation, or part thereof, can be implemented within a business strategy for remote 
configuration management of protection IEDs.  
This highlights consequence of the project outcomes to ensure that they are clear and 
concise with any proposed change in methodology concerning Ergon Energy’s safety 
systems. The project’s outcomes will need to include clear technical explanations for 
proposed changes, clearly state their limitations and those additional requirements 
needed to support any changes to ensure compliance to all legislative, regulatory and 
standards of the relevant authorities imposed onto electricity entities. 
The risk associated with changing functions of a safety system without maintain 
appropriate and best practice engineering design and rigour introduces a risk evaluation 
of the consequence to be ‘Catastrophic’ and the likelihood of ‘Possible/Likely’ 
providing a an overall risk of ‘High/Extreme’ using the DTRMP in Table 20.  
 
G.3 Risk Likelihood Table 
The Risk Likelihood Table is used to assess the likelihood of a risk occurring and in 
applying it one or more relevant likelihood rating definitions can be used to determine 
the likelihood rating (Ergon Energy 2013). 
Table 21: Risk likelihood table 
Likelihood 
Rating 
Likelihood Rating Definitions 
Almost 
Certain 
(1) Probability of occurrence – 90% 
(2) Expected to occur every 12 months 
(3) The event is expected to occur in most circumstances as there is a 
history of regular occurrence 
Likely 
(1) Probability of occurrence – 70% 
(2) Expected to occur every 1 to 5 years 
(3) The is strong possibility the event may occur as there is a history of 
frequent occurrence 
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Likelihood 
Rating 
Likelihood Rating Definitions 
Possible 
(1) Probability of occurrence – 50% 
(2) Expected to occur every 5 to 15 years 
(3) The event may occur at some time as there is a history of casual 
occurrence 
Unlikely 
(1) Probability of occurrence – 30% 
(2) Expected to occur every 15 to 50 years 
(3) Not expected to occur, but there is a slight possibility it may occur at 
some time 
Rare 
(1) Probability of occurrence – 10% 
(2) Expected to occur every 50 to 100 years 
(3) Highly unlikely, but it may occur in exceptional circumstances, but 
probably never will. 
 
G.4 Risk Consequence Table 
The Risk Consequence Table is used to assess the consequence/s or impact/s of a risk 
and in applying it one or more consequence relevant categories can be used to determine 
the consequence rating (Ergon Energy 2013). 
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Table 22: Risk consequence table  
Consequence 
/ Impact 
Category 
Consequence /  Impact Rating Definitions 
Catastrophic Major Moderate Minor Insignificant 
Health & 
Safety 
Single fatality 
of staff, 
contractor or 
public 
Non-
recoverable 
occupational 
illness or 
permanent 
injury 
Injury or 
illness 
requiring 
medical 
treatment by a 
doctor 
Injury requiring 
first aid 
Not applicable 
Injury or 
illness 
requiring 
admission to 
hospital 
Circumstances 
that lead to a 
near miss 
 
 
 
 
